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Thomas W. Merrill† 
Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by 
courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation. 
The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and 
textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of 
theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpreta-
tion provide much better account of actual practice.  This Arti-
cle argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what 
constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the so-
cial practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in 
adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy 
that produces a much better fit between theory and practice. 
The decisional norms employed by adjudicators include faith-
ful agent arguments about governing texts, arguments from 
precedent, and arguments from settled practice, but also, in a 
more qualified fashion, considerations of morality and social 
consequences.  Adjudicators mix and match these norms in 
reaching outcomes but do so in a way that is regarded as 
legitimate by the losers as well as the winners in contested 
adjudications.  A general normative implication of this 
refocused account of legitimacy is that adjudicators, including 
high-level appeals courts, should not stray far from their basic 
function of dispute resolution, as opposed to law declaration. 
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INTRODUCTION: CHANGING THE FOCUS 
This is an Article about the legitimacy of lawmaking by 
adjudicative bodies, most prominently, but not exclusively, 
courts.  The question to be considered is this: When adjudica-
tors resolve a dispute between adverse parties, what types of 
decisional norms can the adjudicator invoke that will be re-
garded as legitimate? 
Currently, the dominant mode of inquiry about the legiti-
macy of decisional norms is framed in terms of legitimate inter-
pretation of enacted texts.  Thus, in constitutional law, we find 
vigorous debates between “originalists” and “living constitu-
tionalists.”1  As a matter of theory, the originalists appear to be 
winning, based on powerful arguments grounded in the con-
sent of the governed and the nature of communicative acts 
more generally. 2  As a matter of descriptive accuracy, however, 
1 For overviews of the literature, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is 
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause 
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 781–96 (2010). 
2 For the argument from the consent of the governed, see KEITH E. WHITTING-
TON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 110–113 (1999).  For the argument from the nature of communicative 
acts, see, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 
DUKE L.J. 979, 987–98 (2017) (summarizing the view that interpretation requires 
the attribution of intent to the speaker); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: 
The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20-30 
(2015) (summarizing argument for determining the meaning of a text as of the 
time it is promulgated).  This hardly exhausts the arguments for originalism. See 
also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE  LOST  CONSTITUTION: THE  PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 88–89, 253–56 (2004) (adhering to the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion promotes individual liberty); JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, 
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 33 (2013) (arguing that the supermajority 
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the living constitutionalists have by far the better case since 
the understanding of the Constitution enforced by the courts 
today bears little resemblance, in many ways large and small, 
to the understanding of the text when it was ratified.3  The 
great tension this has created explains the emergence of claims 
that one can be both an originalist and yet can also embrace 
the evolving nature of constitutional law. 4  So far, however, no 
version of “living originalism” appears to have garnered general 
assent. 
In statutory interpretation, the primary theoretical debate 
pits “textualists” against “purposivists.”5  Textualists point out 
that the only thing actually enacted by the legislature is the 
text of the statute; legislative purposes (unless also set forth in 
the text) are likely to vary from one legislator to another and are 
qualified by compromises reflected in how the statute provides 
for its implementation or enforcement.6  Purposivists counter 
that the words of the text make sense only when read in con-
text, which means only in light of the evident purpose(s) of the 
enactment; moreover, interpreters inevitably rely on various 
aids and devices—like canons of construction—which are not 
themselves part of the text adopted by the legislature.7  Debate 
continues over whether these conflicting perspectives are sus-
support required to ratify and amend the Constitution increases the likelihood 
that its provisions advance social welfare). 
3 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1232–49 (1994) (documenting the ways in which modern 
administrative law is inconsistent with the original understanding of the 
Constitution). 
4 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, 
LIVING  ORIGINALISM] (suggesting that a living constitutionalist approach and an 
originalist approach are “compatible rather than opposed”); William Baude, Is 
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2349–61 (2015) (describing a 
version of originalism more open to giving weight to precedent than is commonly 
supposed); Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 67–71 (2011) (arguing for a broad role for “constitutional 
construction” consistent with a commitment to original meaning). 
5 See generally Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The 
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992) (docu-
menting the rise of theoretical debate about the proper approach to statutory 
interpretation).  For overviews, see generally John F. Manning, What Divides Tex-
tualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 70–78 (2006); Caleb Nelson, 
What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 347–53 (2005). 
6 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 61, 64–68 (1994) (discussing statutory 
interpretation and noting how legislation is produced through compromise). 
7 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845–48 (1992) (defending the use of legislative 
history when interpreting statutes). 
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ceptible of reconciliation in some sort of synthesis.8  Mean-
while, the perspective that seems to match actual practice most 
closely—at least with respect to framework legislation that has 
been subject to frequent interpretation—is dynamic interpreta-
tion. 9  The dynamic account emphasizes how interpretations 
change over time in response to different readings of precedent 
that reflect changing social values.  But this account seems 
difficult to justify in terms of either textualist or purposivist 
theory. 
In both constitutional and statutory contexts, the inquiry 
proceeds as a series of debates about the proper way to inter-
pret particular legal texts, whether it be the Constitution or a 
particular statute.  The authority of the texts themselves re-
mains unquestioned; the question is what they mean.  And the 
performance of any actor in declaring what the text means is 
assessed against rival norms of what constitutes legitimate 
interpretation. 
I propose to discuss the legitimacy of decisional norms 
from a different perspective: that of a particular type of institu-
tional actor—the adjudicator.  There are two critical reasons for 
changing the focus from legitimate interpretation to legitimate 
adjudication. 
The first is that such a change in perspective creates a 
better fit between theory and practice.  Interpretation of the 
language of texts constitutes only a portion of what adjudica-
tors do.  Adjudication draws on a number of other decisional 
variables including, most notably, findings of fact, both histori-
cal facts about the parties to the adjudication and more general 
legislative facts that bear on the dispute.  Adjudicators also pay 
careful attention to precedent, typically prior decisions of 
higher-level tribunals and of the tribunal that engages in the 
adjudication.  In addition, adjudicators often refer, explicitly or 
implicitly, to considerations of equity, fairness, or justice in 
rendering their decisions.  And finally, at least occasionally, 
adjudicators will consider the consequences of particular deci-
8 Compare Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 35–36 (2006) (arguing that textualism and purposivism are converging), 
with Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 117, 131–32 (2009) (arguing that the textualists’ rejection of legislative his-
tory precludes any reconciliation). 
9 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
5–11 (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC] (advancing the thesis that “statutory 
interpretation is dynamic”). For empirical support, which unfortunately is rather 
dated, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An 
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1098–1107 (1992). 
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sions in terms of social welfare.  In practice, these decisional 
variables are interwoven in the process of adjudication.  Refer-
ences to the meaning of the text will be mixed up with findings 
of fact, precedents, and notions of equity or social welfare.  The 
perceived legitimacy of an adjudicator will be a function of how 
the adjudicator deploys these decisional elements in combina-
tion, not just how the adjudicator interprets the language of 
enacted laws. 
The multiplicity of factors that adjudicators draw upon in 
reaching decisions obviously complicates any assessment of 
what will be regarded as legitimate adjudication.  Arguably it is 
preferable to abstract away from these complications and con-
sider what constitutes legitimate interpretation free from these 
complications.  But this kind of abstraction comes at a very 
high cost in terms of realism.  For example, commentators furi-
ously debate whether the Supreme Court should interpret the 
Constitution in accordance with its original understanding, 
and if so, whether it should do so at a high level of abstraction 
or in terms of historically fixed meanings.10  Yet in its decisions 
that arise under the Constitution, the Court relies primarily on 
precedents interpreting the Constitution.11  Only occasionally 
does the Court engage with evidence of original understanding 
in a way that is directly relevant to the outcome of the case. 
Commentators are forced either to ignore actual practice, treat 
it as an irritating exception, or condemn it as illegitimate. 12  An 
approach that begins from the perspective of legitimate adjudi-
cation promises to produce a theory that captures a much 
larger portion of actual practice. 
The second reason for changing the focus from legitimate 
interpretation to legitimate adjudication is that it promises to 
suppress—at least to a degree—the growing perception that 
judges engage in political decision making.  This is because the 
10 Compare BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 263–68 (arguing for 
high level of abstraction that necessarily evolves), with John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 739 
(arguing that broad constitutional language may have concrete or general legal 
meanings, as opposed to abstract meaning, and that the proper interpretation 
must be determined by historical evidence). 
11 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33 (2010). 
12 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(dismissing leading precedent as contrary to the original understanding of the 
First Amendment); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence 
of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (arguing that it is illegitimate to 
allow precedent to trump original understanding); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: 
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) (treating precedent as an 
irritating exception to originalism). 
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rival schools of thought in the disputes about legitimate inter-
pretation have a distinct political valence.  In constitutional 
law, those who espouse originalism are perceived to be hostile 
to Roe v. Wade13 and the regime of abortion rights it estab-
lished, while championing individual gun ownership under the 
Second Amendment.14  Those who favor a living Constitution 
are regarded as holding the opposite views.  In statutory inter-
pretation, textualists are seen as favoring narrow interpreta-
tions of civil rights and environmental statutes; purposive or 
dynamic interpreters are assumed to harbor the opposite posi-
tions.  Whether or not these perceptions are strictly accurate, 
they have come to serve as signaling devices in assessing can-
didates for the bench and feed into bitter partisan battles over 
judicial appointments.  Potential nominees who convey sympa-
thy with originalism or textualism are championed by Republi-
cans and are frantically opposed by Democrats; those who 
express skepticism about these interpretive theories elicit the 
opposite responses. 
Obviously, a change in the theory of legitimacy cannot by 
itself save the judiciary from descending into the maw of parti-
sanship.  But if it would help even a little bit it would be worth 
the effort.  The stakes could not be higher.  As the political 
branches sink into growing animosity, and political polariza-
tion is increasingly reflected in geographic polarization, it be-
comes critical to preserve the authority of institutions 
dedicated to peaceful dispute resolution.  The best way to pre-
serve the legitimacy of courts and other adjudicators, this Arti-
cle contends, is to assess the performance of these institutions 
in terms of norms of legitimate dispute resolution, not legiti-
mate law declaration. 
In pursuing the question of what constitutes legitimate ad-
judication I will follow the lead of H.L.A. Hart and modern legal 
positivists in looking to social practice as the source of legiti-
macy.  Legitimacy as I use the term is not something that can 
be deduced from a higher-level premise, like the consent of the 
governed, the nature of communicative acts, or conformance 
with the ideals of international human rights.  It is, instead, a 
function of sociology or what Hart called social practice.15  Hart 
and his successors have been concerned with identifying what 
13 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
14 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–37 (2008) (interpret-
ing the Second Amendment to protect an individual’s right to possess firearms). 
15 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–17 (3d ed. 2012). See also Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 
1792–1802 (2005) (distinguishing legal, sociological, and moral concepts of legiti-
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is regarded as “law” by considering the social practices of offi-
cials, most prominently courts.16  In particular, they postulate 
that law is determined by courts applying a rule of recognition, 
which is in turn a function of social practice.  The major depar-
ture from Hartian approach in this Article involves the identity 
of the “recognitional community” that determines legitimacy. 17 
I argue that the critical community that determines what con-
stitutes legitimate adjudication consists of the losers in adjudi-
cation, as advised by their lawyers.  The losers will commonly 
regard the decision as wrong.  But as long as they regard the 
outcome as legitimate, they will comply with the judgment. 
Adjudicators cannot afford to incur more than occasional defi-
ance of their judgments; hence they will systematically strive to 
reach judgments that both the winners and the losers regard 
as legitimate. 
The effort here to explicate the norms of legitimate adjudi-
cation is primarily descriptive or interpretive, rather than pre-
scriptive or normative.  Nevertheless, in the final section of the 
Article, I will consider three possible normative implications of 
the analysis.  Each of these implications concerns ways in 
which the law-declaration function of adjudicators appears to 
be ascendant and the dispute-resolution function in retreat. 
Each presents a growing risk that the judiciary will be per-
ceived, at least by the losers in contested cases, as having 
eschewed the norms of legitimate adjudication in favor of 
adopting decisional norms preferred by the winner.  The first 
involves the vexed question of how and when to adopt faithful 
agent modes of argument in adjudicating claims brought under 
very old and effectively unamendable laws like the Constitu-
tion.  The second concerns the manner in which adjudicators 
deploy arguments from precedent in rendering their decisions, 
particularly the growing use of what I call “Scrabble Board 
precedentialism.”  This leaves existing precedent undisturbed 
and quotes extensively from previous opinions while in fact 
endorsing significant innovations in law that deviate from a fair 
integration of prior precedent and settled practice.  The third 
macy and endorsing the sociological perspective as the most useful for purposes 
of jurisprudential analysis). 
16 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 83–104 (2018) [hereinafter FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY] (describing a “prac-
tice based” theory of legitimacy for assessing the performance of the Supreme 
Court). 
17 The phrase “recognitional community” is taken from Matthew D. Adler, 
Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground 
U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 726 (2006). 
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concerns the rapid growth in the issuance of universal injunc-
tions by federal district courts in order to block immigration 
initiatives adopted by the executive branch.  In our politically 
polarized world, with rapidly expanding perceptions that the 
judiciary is also politically polarized, each of these trends, if not 
checked, poses a threat to the legitimacy of courts as our pri-
mary instrument of peaceful dispute resolution. 
I 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGITIMATE ADJUDICATION 
A. The Centrality of Dispute Resolution 
Adjudication has a function that distinguishes it from 
other activities that entail interpretation of enacted texts.  The 
primary purpose of adjudication is to resolve a dispute.  Often, 
these are disputes between private, i.e., nongovernmental, ac-
tors.  Sometimes the dispute is between the government and a 
nongovernmental actor.  In either form, the primary purpose of 
adjudication is to resolve a conflict pitting A against B.  Other 
interpreters may be interested in avoiding, creating, influenc-
ing, or predicting the outcome of such conflicts.  But they are 
not charged with resolving conflicts, which is the distinctive 
function of adjudication. 
That adjudication entails dispute resolution is true virtu-
ally by definition.18  That dispute resolution is the primary pur-
pose of adjudication has been proclaimed by many esteemed 
authorities.19  Yet we do not have to rest on a priori reasoning 
to perceive the centrality of dispute resolution to the institution 
of adjudication.  This is revealed in a number of social practices 
of adjudicators, at least in the American legal tradition. 
18 Adjudication, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “adjudica-
tion” as “[t]he legal process of resolving a dispute”). 
19 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 
12 (1930); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 175–76 
(2d ed. 2009); Neil MacCormick, Why Cases Have Rationes and What These Are, 
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 158–59 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1991).  The fountainhead of 
American public law, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), 
rests on the dispute resolution function of courts as the source of judicial author-
ity.  Those who endorse a broad “law declaration” function for the courts often 
quote the line from Marbury that it is “the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.” Id.  They commonly omit the very next 
sentence, which explains why this is the “province and duty” of the courts: “Those 
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret 
that rule.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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First, adjudicators will dismiss an action if it appears that 
there is no actual dispute to be resolved.20  This is especially 
prominent in the practice of federal courts, although it also 
characterizes state courts and even administrative agencies to 
a significant degree.  Thus, the Supreme Court has developed 
an elaborate jurisprudence of standing, designed to weed out 
cases brought by persons who cannot claim to be suffering a 
concrete and particularized injury that will be redressed by 
adjudication.21  This jurisprudence is supplemented by stric-
tures against deciding controversies that are moot, are insuffi-
ciently ripe, will be decided in due course by other tribunals, or 
present questions that have been assigned to other branches of 
government.22  The Court has largely justified these doctrines 
on the ground that they are required by the language of the 
Constitution describing the judicial power in terms of “cases” 
and “controversies.”23  A deeper rationale is the understanding 
that the core function of adjudication is dispute resolution. 
Second, an adjudication results in a decision that is bind-
ing only on the parties that have presented their dispute to the 
20 See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (“[C]ourts will not ‘pass 
upon . . . abstract, intellectual problems,’ but adjudicate ‘concrete, living con-
test[s] between adversaries.’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939)); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 
442 U.S. 289, 297–98 (1979) (“The basic inquiry is whether the ‘conflicting con-
tentions of the parties . . . present a real, substantial controversy between parties 
having adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or 
abstract.’”) (quoting Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)); Muskrat v. 
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911) (noting that a prerequisite to bringing a 
matter into court is “ ‘the existence of present or possible adverse parties, whose 
contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication.’”). 
21 See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546–50 (2016) (summa-
rizing the tenets of standing doctrine). 
22 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974) (stating that an action 
is moot when it no longer “ ‘touch[es] the legal relations of parties having adverse 
legal interests.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 
U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937)); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 
(1947) (stating that a case is not ripe when the parties no longer need “judicial 
authority for their protection against actual interference.”); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (abstaining from deciding a constitutional 
claim because “[i]t touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal 
courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open.”); see 
also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230–38 (1993) (concluding that legal 
questions regarding the impeachment process are assigned to Congress to 
resolve). 
23 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“Article III of the 
Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and 
‘controversies.’”). 
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tribunal for resolution.24  As to the parties, a final adjudication 
is res judicata.  If the loser defies the judgment, the winner can 
bring an action for contempt or for execution on the judgment, 
and the factual findings and legal conclusions reached in the 
original action cannot be revisited.25  But if someone who is not 
a party defies a legal interpretation reflected in an adjudication, 
an adversary must bring an entirely new proceeding to secure 
relief, and the defendant in the new proceeding is free to raise 
any and all arguments in support of a contrary outcome.26  The 
conclusions reached in the first adjudication may be given re-
spectful consideration as a matter of precedent, but contesta-
tion will not be foreclosed.  This reflects a basic understanding 
that the only authority of an adjudicator to legally bind persons 
is its power to enter judgments establishing the legal rights and 
obligations of the parties who have presented their dispute to 
the tribunal for its resolution. 
Third, not only are judicial decisions binding on the par-
ties, the Court has held that Congress has no power to override 
final judicial judgments resolving individual disputes.27  The 
Court reasoned that the “judicial power” given to federal courts 
by Article III of the Constitution is the power to “render disposi-
tive judgments” that conclusively resolve a case or controversy 
between adverse parties.28  “Having achieved finality,” the 
Court explained, “a judicial decision becomes the last word of 
the judicial department with regard to a particular case or con-
troversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legisla-
tion that the law applicable to that very case was something 
other than what the courts said it was.”29  In other words, 
dispute resolution is so central to the function of courts it must 
be walled off from legislative intrusion. 
Fourth, all adjudicators who issue written opinions follow a 
practice of reciting in the opinion a relatively detailed account 
of conflict between the parties and how that conflict came to be 
presented to the adjudicator.30  Even the highest level appeals 
courts do not proceed by announcing a legal issue and plung-
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  JUDGMENTS § 34(3) (AM. LAW  INST. 1982); 18A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4449 (3d ed. 2018). 
25 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations 
for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 66 (1993). 
26 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1989). 
27 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 211 (1995). 
28 Id. at 219 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1989)). 
29 Id. at 227. 
30 LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 94 (1968) [hereinafter FULLER, ANATOMY]. 
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ing into an explanation of how it will be resolved.  They begin by 
describing, usually in some detail, the history of the dispute 
between the parties.  Often these narratives include details that 
are not strictly germane to the ultimate judgment the adjudica-
tor settles upon.  Yet the adjudicator will recite them in order to 
clarify how the parties came into conflict and how the various 
dimensions of that conflict have been resolved or have re-
mained unresolved through earlier stages in the adjudication. 
This practice reveals that adjudicators see their function as 
fundamentally one of dispute resolution. 
Finally, consider the performance of nominees for judicial 
appointments in federal confirmation hearings.  Regardless of 
the party affiliation of the participants in these rituals, nomi-
nees always present themselves as committed to the dispute 
resolution model of the judicial process.  Whether it is Chief 
Justice John Roberts, insisting that his job is simply to act as a 
neutral umpire calling balls and strikes, 31 or Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, declining to “engage in a question that involves 
hypotheses,”32 the nominee intuitively appreciates that the dis-
pute resolution model is the one with the best chance of being 
accepted as legitimate by his or her interlocutors.  A nominee 
who proclaims the primary function is something else (whether 
it be promoting social justice or restoring the Constitution in 
exile) would be attacked as proposing to “legislate from the 
bench” and would face an enhanced risk of rejection.33 
In stressing the centrality of dispute resolution, I do not 
deny that adjudication serves additional functions.  These in-
clude social control, especially in the criminal law context;34 
“enrichment of the supply of legal rules,” especially in common 
law cases;35 and preserving the supremacy of the Constitution 
and federal law more generally, especially in cases presenting 
31 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 55–56 (2005). 
32 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2009). 
33 As a byproduct of this caution, confirmation hearings have become frus-
trating affairs for interlocutors. See Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and 
New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 941 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIR-
MATION MESS (1994)) (noting that confirmation hearings (well before her own) have 
become “a vapid and hollow charade, in which repetition of platitudes has re-
placed discussion of viewpoints and personal anecdotes have supplanted legal 
analysis.”). 
34 MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17–20 (1981) 
[hereinafter SHAPIRO, COURTS]. 
35 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4 (1988). 
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separation of powers and federalism disputes.36  All this is un-
doubtedly true.  But it does not detract from the point that 
dispute resolution is the sine qua non of adjudication.37 
Courts and other adjudicators perform these additional func-
tions only in the course of resolving disputes.  Whether adjudi-
cation performs these or other functions is contingent on 
special circumstances that are not invariably present. 
The centrality of dispute resolution to the legitimacy of 
adjudication has been emphasized in a trenchant analysis by 
Martin Shapiro.38  His most general comments, supported by a 
wide-ranging comparative analysis of courts in different socie-
ties, are worth quoting at length: 
Cutting quite across cultural lines, it appears that when-
ever two persons come into a conflict that they cannot them-
selves solve, one solution appealing to common sense is to 
call upon a third for assistance in achieving a resolution.  So 
universal across both time and space is this simple social 
invention of triads that we can discover almost no society 
that fails to employ it.  And from its overwhelming appeal to 
common sense stems the basic political legitimacy of courts 
everywhere.  In short, the triad for purposes of conflict reso-
lution is the basic social logic of courts, a logic so compelling 
that courts have become a universal political phenomenon. 
The triad, however, involves a basic instability, paradox, 
or dialectic that accounts for a large proportion of the schol-
arly quarrels over the nature of courts and the political diffi-
culties that courts encounter in the real world.  At the 
moment the two disputants find their third, the social logic of 
the court device is preeminent.  A moment later, when the 
third decides in favor of one of the two disputants, a shift 
occurs from the triad to a structure that is perceived by the 
loser as two against one.  To the loser there is no social logic 
in two against one.  There is only the brute fact of being 
outnumbered.  A substantial portion of the total behavior of 
36 See Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What the Dia-
logue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 23–26 (2019); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
665, 717–18 (2012). 
37 See generally, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 73–75 (7th ed. 2015) (contrasting the “dis-
pute resolution” model of adjudication with the “law declaration” model, but 
cautioning that the law declaration model, “sensibly construed, cannot be under-
stood to license judicial review at the behest of any would-be litigant on the basis 
on any hypothesized set of facts or indeed no facts whatsoever[ ]” and acknowledg-
ing that “[t]he Supreme Court has never explicitly rejected the dispute resolution 
model.”). 
38 SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34 passim. 
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courts in all societies can be analyzed in terms of attempts to 
prevent the triad from breaking down into two against one.39 
Shapiro’s functional insight serves as the starting point for 
my analysis of legitimate adjudication.  Put simply, if adjudica-
tion is to be perceived as legitimate, the adjudicator must seek 
to resolve the dispute in such a way that the loser does not 
believe he or she is outnumbered two to one.  In Shapiro’s 
words, “[t]he basic tension to be found in courts as conflict 
resolvers lies in their need to persuade the parties that judges 
and laws they have not chosen nonetheless constitute a genu-
ine, neutral third.”40 
B. Sources of Adjudicator Legitimacy 
How do adjudicators establish and maintain a reputation 
for neutrality, and hence legitimacy?  A number of institutional 
practices contribute to overcoming or at least diminishing the 
two-against-one problem.  Some are well known, and I mention 
them briefly since they fall outside my main topic of concern, 
which is decisional norms.  Establishing the independence of 
the adjudicator from either of the contesting parties is impor-
tant.41  Prohibiting adjudicators from deciding cases in which 
they have a financial or personal interest is important.42  Care-
ful attention to fact finding is important, since the fact-finding 
process will nearly always be perceived by the parties as having 
an objective foundation in the world outside the courtroom.43 
Giving reasons in support of judgments is important.44 
39 Id. at 1–2. 
40 Id. at 17. 
41 Id. at 19 (“It is to counteract [the] perceptions of judges as part of a two 
against one rather than a genuinely triadic structure that the prototype stresses 
the ‘independence’ of the judge.”). 
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (requiring judge or magistrate to disqualify him-
self if he “has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party 
to the proceeding”). 
43 SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34, at 43–49. 
44 Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1002 (2008) 
(“When parties offer reasons for their claims in the form of legal arguments . . . 
they can reasonably expect that judges will weigh those reasons and provide a 
decision based on an evaluation of them.  Decisions reached without regard to 
reasons are not responsive to the underlying conflict between the parties.”) (foot-
note omitted); see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 
656–59 (1995) (arguing that reason-giving is a commitment by the decision maker 
to prioritize reliance and stability); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Can-
dor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (“A requirement that judges give reasons 
for their decisions . . . serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s 
exercise of power.”). 
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Although the forgoing social practices are individually and 
collectively important in establishing and maintaining the legit-
imacy of adjudication, I will concentrate on an additional fea-
ture critical to the legitimacy of adjudication, namely, the 
invocation by the adjudicator of one or more objective deci-
sional norms as a foundation for resolution of the conflict.  This 
is where my inquiry crosses paths with the contemporary de-
bate about legitimate interpretation. 
The need to resolve disputes with reference to some objec-
tive decisional norm follows from the central imperative of ad-
judication, which is to convince the loser that the outcome is 
not simply the “brute fact” of being outnumbered two to one.  If 
the adjudicator can point to some proposition over which the 
adjudicator has no control as the foundational norm that gov-
erns the resolution of the controversy, this will obviously in-
crease the willingness of the loser to believe that the outcome is 
a function of something other than the adjudicator’s preference 
for the winner. 
In terms of the types of norms that satisfy the requirement 
of objectivity we find considerable variation across human soci-
eties over time and space.  Modern societies tend to emphasize 
that the adjudicator must resolve the dispute in a manner con-
sistent with existing law.  Existing law, on this understanding, 
is regarded as having an objective and ascertainable content 
independent of the personal preferences of the adjudicator. 
But we know that other societies have invoked different sorts of 
norms for resolving disputes in a manner independent of the 
preferences of the adjudicator.  Medieval societies used trial by 
ordeal and trial by battle as ways of resolving disputes.45  Ear-
lier societies used practices such as examining the entrails of 
animals to resolve disputes.46  As should be obvious, social 
practice again dictates what will be regarded as a permissible 
in the way of an objective norm to serve as the foundation for 
an adjudication.  The relevant point, for present purposes, is 
that nearly all forms of adjudication, if they are regarded as 
legitimate, will invoke one or more norms as a basis for resolv-
ing the dispute that will be perceived by the disputing parties 
45 See Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common 
Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 90, 110–11 (Morris S. Arnold et al. 
eds., 1981) (trial by ordeal); EDWARD J. WHITE, Trial by Battle in LEGAL ANTIQUITIES: 
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS UPON ANCIENT LAWS AND CUSTOMS 109, 109 (1913) (trial by 
battle). 
46 See Morris Jastrow, Jr., Hepatoscopy and Astrology in Babylonia and As-
syria, 47 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 646, 646 (1908). 
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as having an objective basis independent of the preferences of 
the adjudicator. 
C. Losers as the Relevant Recognitional Community 
Before considering what decisional norms are regarded as 
legitimate for purposes of adjudication in the context of con-
temporary American social practice, it is important to identify 
whose social practices are relevant in this regard.  Hart was 
somewhat unclear in specifying whose social practices count in 
identifying the norms we regard as law.  Sometimes he wrote of 
public officials being the relevant reference group; sometimes 
he referred more narrowly to courts.47  His successors have 
divided over whether public officials or courts are the appropri-
ate recognitional community.48 
As should be obvious, the institutional actors with which I 
am concerned are courts and other adjudicators, not other 
public officials or members of the general public.  In a depar-
ture from Hartian jurisprudence, however, I do not view the 
matter as simply one in which courts proceed in accordance 
with their own social practices.  Instead, in keeping with Sha-
piro’s key insight that problem of legitimacy for adjudicators is 
whether the loser regards the decision as legitimate, I will argue 
that the relevant audience consists of the parties who present 
their dispute for adjudication, not the adjudicators themselves. 
To be sure, adjudicators will look to past practices of other 
adjudicators for guidance in adopting decisional norms.  But 
the ultimate touchstone will always be what the parties—most 
critically the loser—regard as legitimate.  The loser will be more 
inclined to accept the legitimacy of the adjudication if he or she 
perceives that the decision (in addition to having the other 
qualities previously mentioned) rests on decisional norms that 
the loser recognizes as being legitimate.  In this sense, the ulti-
mate recognitional community is not the adjudicator but the 
parties who submit their conflict to resolution by the 
adjudicator. 
Here I hasten to offer an important qualification: the par-
ties’ views about the legitimacy of the process will be signifi-
cantly influenced by the advice of their lawyers.  In particular, 
the decisional norms employed by the adjudicator are likely to 
require some explication for nonlegally trained parties.  On 
47 Compare HART, supra note 15, at 111–17 (discussing rule of recognition 
based on social practices of officials) with id. at 256 (grounding rule of recognition 
in social practices of courts in the postscript). 
48 Adler, supra note 17, at 723–26. 
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other dimensions of the process, this is less true.  With respect 
to findings of fact, the parties will typically understand the 
points of disagreement and will be keenly aware of how the 
adjudicator resolves these disagreements.  With respect to the 
adjudicator’s choice of decisional norms, however, the parties 
will typically be dependent on their lawyers in forming any 
judgment about whether the adjudicator has adopted an objec-
tive norm, i.e. one that is not stacked against the losing party. 
On this dimension—which is my focus of concern here—the 
relevant recognitional community is the parties as advised by 
their lawyers. 
One could go further and say that, at least with respect to 
the choice of decisional norms, the lawyers representing the 
parties are the critical recognitional community.49  Consider 
how the matter appears to the parties.  The immediate question 
may be whether to accept a plea bargain or offer of settlement. 
The parties will seek the advice of their lawyers about the adju-
dicator’s likely view of the relevant decisional norms, perhaps 
as foreshadowed by the adjudicator’s response to preliminary 
motions.  The parties will want to know if the adjudicator’s view 
of the relevant decisional norms is amenable to change after a 
more complete presentation of argument.  If a final judgment is 
entered, the question for the loser will be whether to file an 
appeal.  The loser will want to hear from her lawyer about 
whether the adjudicator adopted one or more decisional norms 
vulnerable to being overturned on appeal. 
Critically, the function of the lawyers in the adjudication 
process goes well beyond advice giving to the parties.  The law-
yers are also actively engaged in seeking to persuade the adju-
dicator about the decisional norms the adjudicator should 
adopt for resolution of the dispute.50  They do so through filing 
motions and briefs and in oral argument.  Often the give-and-
take between the lawyers will significantly narrow the range of 
potential decisional norms presented for consideration.  Most 
adjudicators are too busy to go off in search of a set of norms 
different than the ones presented by the lawyers.51  If, as usu-
49 See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 621, 665 (1987) (observing that a lawyer advising a client about the 
law will adopt “something very close to the sociologist’s approach” to identifying 
the law). 
50 FULLER, ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 109 (“A judge is one who decides dis-
putes within an institutional framework assuring to the litigant a collaborative 
role, which consists in the opportunity to state, prove, and argue his case.”). 
51 Consider the occasional laments of Justices Scalia and Thomas that they 
cannot resolve an issue in accordance with the original understanding of the 
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ally happens, the adjudicator adopts norms that have been 
presented by the lawyers, perhaps as qualified by objections 
advanced by opposing lawyers, it is small wonder lawyers ordi-
narily advise their clients that the choice of decisional norms is 
legitimate. 
In a sense then, one can say that the adjudicator and the 
lawyers for the parties constitute an “interpretive community” 
or “coordinating convention” that collectively works to identify 
the decisional norms that will be used to resolve the dispute.52 
They will nearly always share a common educational back-
ground, having graduated from law school.  There, they will 
have absorbed certain conventions about the appropriate 
norms to use in resolving disputes between adverse parties. 
Their understanding of these norms will have been refined 
through practice.  Lawyers who specialize in appellate litigation 
will be particularly attuned to the range and type of decisional 
norms that the legal community regards as legitimate at any 
moment in time.53 
Constitution because the relevant material was not presented by the parties. See, 
e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(declining to consider whether the enacted statute was a proper exercise of the 
Commerce Clause because the question was not presented by the parties); 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517–18 (1996) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part) (stating that he could not determine the scope of regulation of com-
mercial speech when the Constitution was adopted because the parties and their 
amici did not address the point). 
52 See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 95–98 (1989) (arguing that the 
practice of law should be understood as a profession that constitutes an interpre-
tive community); Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Founda-
tions of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982) (explicating the rule of recognition in 
terms of coordinating conventions shared by courts, the parties, and their law-
yers). See also Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 187 (1985) 
(“I picture the judge trying to choose, in a self-conscious and reflective manner, 
between the arguments of the contending lawyers, and in that process thinking 
about and perhaps discussing (with colleagues and clerks) the rules and norms of 
the profession—What do they imply for the case at hand?”). 
53 One study, which tested the ability of a panel of experts to predict the 
outcome of future Supreme Court decisions, found that legal academics had a 
53% success rate in predicting outcomes whereas experienced Supreme Court 
advocates predicted correctly 92% of the time. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The 
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Pre-
dicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1177–88 (2004). 
Although the number of experienced advocates in the study was too small to be 
statistically significant, this suggests that active participants in adjudication may 
have a superior sense of existing decisional norms. Id. The same study found that 
a statistical model was more accurate in predicting outcomes of Supreme Court 
decisions than was the panel of experts, which included both the legal academics 
and the experienced Supreme Court advocates.  Id. at 1171.  Since the “experts” 
consisted primarily of legal academics, this result does not necessarily contradict 
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D. The Enforcement Constraint 
An objection to the foregoing might be that the views of the 
parties, as advised by their lawyers, provide little constraint on 
adjudicators because adjudicators are confident that any final 
decision they reach will be enforced against the losing party. 
Losers acquiesce in the results of adjudications, on this view, 
because they are advised by their lawyers that the judgment 
will be enforced, if need be by force in the form of seizure of 
assets or jail time for contempt.  The threat of coercive enforce-
ment action, and not legitimacy, explains the high rates of 
voluntary compliance with final judgments.54 
The objection is consistent with classical legal positivism, 
which characterized law as an order backed by the threat of 
sanctions.55  But modern research indicates that obedience to 
law is fostered more by belief in its legitimacy than by the 
threat of sanctions.56  The same is probably true of compliance 
with judgments.  The ultimate reason why judgments are rou-
tinely obeyed is that the parties to adjudicated disputes, over 
time, have concluded that the decisional norms adopted by 
adjudicators are generally legitimate.  It is not necessary that 
every judgment be regarded as legitimate.  Especially for tribu-
nals like the Supreme Court, which have amassed a very large 
storehouse of legitimacy over a long period of time, it is possible 
to “expend” some of this accumulated capital in reaching occa-
the finding that active participants may have a superior sense of existing judicial 
norms. Id. at 1168. 
54 Data on rates of voluntary compliance are hard to come by, which in itself 
indicates that noncompliance is not seen as a pressing issue.  Justice Department 
statistics indicate that contempt citations to enforce federal court orders are quite 
rare—less than 0.2% of all criminal referrals handled by the Department (over half 
of which were not prosecuted).  Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2014 
Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T  JUST. BUREAU  JUST. STAT. 11 tbl.2.2 (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW4N-
EHPG] (The table combines contempt referrals with referrals for “perjury” and 
“intimidation,” and is thus overinclusive.).  Looking at the published budget of 
Marshals Service, it is difficult to determine what portion is devoted to executing 
court orders.  Whatever it is, it is too small to warrant a separate line in the Office 
of Management and Budget’s annual budgetary breakdown.  The major budgetary 
categories for the Marshals Service are “judicial and courthouse security,” “fugi-
tive apprehension,” “prisoner security and transportation, “protection of wit-
nesses,” and “tactical operations.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL  YEAR 2018, at 692 
(2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/ 
fy2018/appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJM7-C2XU]. 
55 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF  JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 151 (1995) 
(“The binding virtue of a law lies in the sanction annexed to it.”). 
56 See generally, TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 58–59 (2006). (find-
ing that compliance with the law is strongly influenced by perceptions of 
legitimacy). 
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sional decisions that the loser regards as highly dubious.57 
Nevertheless, widespread compliance with judgments ulti-
mately depends on belief that the decisional norms employed 
by the adjudicator are nearly always legitimate. 
The place to start in considering the relevance of enforce-
ment of judgments is Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Paper 
No. 78.  In this essay, Hamilton was anxious to reassure those 
skeptical about the proposed Constitution that they had noth-
ing to fear from the creation of a federal judiciary.58  He wrote 
that the judiciary would be the “least dangerous” of the three 
branches, because it would have “no influence over either the 
sword or the purse.”59  Indeed, the courts “must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm” for the enforcement 
of their judgments.  Consequently, he wrote, the courts would 
exercise “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment . . . .” 
60 
What was Hamilton driving at?  He implied, but did not 
expressly state, that judicial judgments based on “will” rather 
than “judgment” would be met with resistance from the execu-
tive.61  This in turn implied that judges would have a powerful 
incentive to ground their decisions in “judgment”—in other 
57 Political scientists have hypothesized that the Court enjoys high “diffuse” 
support even if “specific” support for particular decisions is low. See James L. 
Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conven-
tional Wisdom and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 201, 
206 (2014).  Thus, although many thought the decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
98 (2000), would destroy the Court’s legitimacy, this did not happen. See James 
L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 533 (2007).  This does not mean that exposure to a 
long sequence of decisions that appear to be illegitimate would not undermine the 
standing of the Court.  Evidence from opinion surveys indicates that support for 
the Court declines when its decisions are presented as being driven by the politi-
cal preferences of the Justices. See infra note 199.  This is a plausible explanation 
for the precipitous decline in public approval of the way the Court is “doing its 
job,” falling from 74% in a 2001 Gallup to 45% in 2015. FALLON, LAW AND LEGITI-
MACY supra note 16, at 156. 
58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 
81 (Alexander Hamilton) (making the same point more briefly). 
59 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 58. 
60 Id. 
61 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power 
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 251–52 (1994) (interpreting Hamilton as 
making such an argument); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Fair and Impartial Adju-
dication, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 897, 900 (2019) (“[I]f adjudicators know they are 
ultimately dependent on the political branches for enforcement of their judg-
ments, they will not stray very far, certainly not on a consistent basis, from settled 
expectations about the decisional norms that they must use in assessing the 
conduct of the parties that come before them.”). 
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words, to rule in a fashion regarded by the parties as 
legitimate. 
As things turned out, the executive was not given discre-
tion to decline to enforce individual judgments, “willful” or not. 
Shortly after Hamilton highlighted the weakness of federal 
courts in an effort to secure ratification of the Constitution, a 
Congress dominated by the Federalist Party enacted, as part of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, a statute creating the U.S. Marshals 
Service and requiring it to enforce all “lawful precepts” issued 
by federal judges.62  With variations in language, this statutory 
obligation has remained on the books ever since.63  On rare 
occasions, Presidents or their lawyers have asserted that they 
might defy a judicial judgment.64  But nearly all commentators 
regard these episodes as outliers.  The dominant position of 
Presidents and their lawyers has been that the executive is 
duty bound to enforce all final federal court judgments.65  This 
duty is grounded in a statute and the internal executive norm 
that has grown up around it.  State court orders, which are 
generally enforced by county sheriffs’ offices, are governed by a 
similar understanding. 
This does not mean that concerns about compliance have 
disappeared.  A recent study by Nicholas Parrillo of cases in 
which federal agencies have failed to comply with judicial judg-
ments is illuminating in this regard.  Parrillo finds that coercive 
sanctions (monetary penalties, jail time for officials, or fines of 
62 For the original enactment, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 
73, 87 (providing for the appointment of a marshal in each federal judicial district, 
and stipulating that the marshal should “execute throughout the district, all 
lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United 
States . . . .”). 
63 See 28 U.S.C. § 566(a) (2018) (“It is the primary role and mission of the 
United States Marshals Service to provide for the security and to obey, execute, 
and enforce all orders of the United States District Courts, the United States 
Courts of Appeals, the Court of International Trade, and the United States Tax 
Court, as provided by law.”). 
64 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22 (discussing a comment made by President Nixon’s lawyer 
at oral argument in the tapes case) [hereinafter Fallon, Jr., Executive Power]; 
Paulsen, supra note 61, at 259–60  n.159 (discussing President Andrew Jackson’s 
alleged refusal to enforce the Supreme Court’s judgment about state interference 
with the Cherokee). 
65 See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1821–26 
(2008) (and sources cited).  The most prominent dissenting voice is Michael Paul-
sen. See Paulsen, supra note 61, at 294–303.  The duty of the executive to comply 
with judicial judgments, including those about the meaning of the Constitution, is 
longstanding. See PHILIP  HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 543 (2008) (noting 
that it is “difficult to locate constitutional cases from the first fifteen years after 
Independence in which a party resisted the authority of a court to give judgment”). 
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officials) are almost never imposed on noncompliant agencies. 
In the rare case in which sanctions are imposed, the sanction-
ing court typically backs down after further rounds of litigation 
or the court is reversed on appeal, usually on case specific 
grounds.66  One plausible explanation for this pattern of judi-
cial behavior is that courts suffer from Hamiltonian anxiety 
about a showdown with the executive, given the dependence of 
courts on the executive for enforcement of  their judgments.  In 
effect, when executive agencies engage courts in a game of 
“chicken,” the courts swerve.67  Another explanation might be 
that administrative defiance of judicial judgments is extremely 
rare, precisely because agencies regard most judicial judg-
ments as legitimate.  In the unusual case where the court en-
counters executive resistance, the sanctioning court (or its 
appeals court) may interpret the defiance as a signal that the 
executive has reasonable grounds for questioning the legiti-
macy of the court’s judgment.  This signal causes the judiciary 
to reconsider its order.  As Parrillo observes, “if a judge issues 
an order so aggressive or rigid as to invite official disobedience, 
the judge risks undermining the self-reinforcing perception 
that compliance is the norm.”68 
Congress can also get into the act when it is unhappy with 
particular judgments entered by federal courts.  After the Ninth 
Circuit held that the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional,69 and the Eleventh 
Circuit held that a granite monument to the Ten Command-
ments in the Alabama State Judicial Building had to be re-
moved,70 the House of Representatives passed two 
appropriations riders prohibiting the Marshals Service from 
spending any money to enforce these judgments.  Both riders 
66 Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental 
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 712–35, 
745–46, 761 (2018). 
67 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THE-
ORY AND THE LAW 44 (1994) (explaining the game of chicken). 
68 Parrillo, supra note 66, at 790.  One study of institutional reform litigation 
notes that prison officials in Texas resisted complying with court-ordered prison 
reform because they regarded the orders as “illegitimate.”  Sheldon Ekland-Olson 
& Steve J. Martin, Organizational Compliance with Court-Ordered Reform, 22 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 359, 371 (1988). 
69 Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002). 
70 Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003).  Alabama Chief 
Justice Roy Moore refused to comply with the judgment, which led to his suspen-
sion by the other Justices on the court. Ten Commandments Judge Removed from 
Office, S. POVERTY L. CENTER (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.splcenter.org/news/ 
2003/11/13/ten-commandments-judge-removed-office [https://perma.cc/ 
8RZ4-WEEQ]. 
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were deleted by the Conference Committee, as was a similar 
rider approved by the House several years later involving a 
judgment about a Ten Commandments monument in Indi-
ana.71  Whether such targeted riders are constitutional is unt-
ested.  Nevertheless, they underscore the dependence of the 
courts on the support of the political branches for enforcement 
of judgments. 
Concern about compliance with judgments is not the end 
of the matter, however.  Although courts have little reason to 
worry that their judgments will be enforced (except in rare 
cases), it is much less certain that the decisional rules courts 
espouse in support of their judgments will be followed in the 
future.72  The legal commentary is divided on the question 
whether nonparties have a duty to comply with the legal ratio-
nales adopted by courts in support of their judgments.73 
Whether or not such a duty exists, there are many examples in 
recent history of Supreme Court decisions being ignored, pro-
tested, and occasionally defied by officials other than those 
immediately subject to a judgment.74  There is also extensive 
evidence that courts adjust the remedies they adopt for legal 
violations in order to maximize the prospect of compliance, by 
parties and nonparties alike.75  Finally, there is the famous 
insight of Alexander Bickel that the Court will frequently ap-
71 These episodes are reviewed in Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress’s 
Power to Block Enforcement of Federal Court Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 
1323–26 (2008). 
72 As Alexander Bickel wrote: 
“[N]o one is under any legal obligation to carry out a rule of constitu-
tional law announced by the Supreme Court until someone else has 
conducted a successful litigation and obtained a decree directing 
him to do so.  Any rule of constitutional law not put into effect 
voluntarily by officials and other persons who acquiesce in it, or not 
taken up by legislation and made more effective by administrative or 
noncoercive means—any such rule is not in our system an effective 
rule of law.” 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 111 (1975). 
73 My view is that judicial opinions should be regarded as predictive of future 
judicial judgments, but not legally binding on nonparties. See Merrill, supra note 
25; accord, Fallon, Jr., Executive Power, supra note 64, at 12; Saikrishna Prakash 
& John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1560–64 
(2005).  For the contrary view, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997). 
74 For an account of popular and political resistance to rulings on desegrega-
tion, school prayer, criminal procedure, and other matters, see generally BARRY 
FRIEDMAN, THE  WILL OF THE  PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC  OPINION  HAS  INFLUENCED THE  SU-
PREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 237–79 (2009). 
75 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884–89 (1999) (summarizing various ways the Court has 
modified remedies to enhance enforcement). 
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proach controversial issues tentatively, through jurisdictional 
or justiciability rulings, before finally ruling on the merits.76 
One explanation for this pattern of behavior is that the Court 
wants to test the degree of potential opposition to a controver-
sial ruling, including the likelihood of noncompliance.77 
In any event, it is incorrect to assume that the strong norm 
of executive enforcement of judgments means that adjudica-
tors are unconcerned with whether losers regard their judg-
ments as legitimate.  The executive norm very likely owes its 
existence to the perception that judicial judgments are nearly 
always legitimate.  And judicial judgments may nearly always 
be legitimate, in significant part, because courts and other ad-
judicators are aware that they are dependent on the executive 
(and the legislature, which funds the executive) for the efficacy 
of their judgments.78 
In short, when I speak of legitimate decisional norms, I 
refer to norms that the loser’s lawyer advises are broadly ac-
ceptable within the legal community.  The loser may sincerely 
believe that the judgment is wrong (probably more often than 
not does believe this).  But the loser will nonetheless acquiesce 
in the judgment if the loser is advised by her lawyer that the 
decisional norms adopted by the adjudicator are legitimate.  In 
modern societies, this means the decisional norms are recog-
nized to be grounded in law.  It is in an effort to identify what it 
means for a decisional norm to be grounded in law that I now 
turn. 
II 
LEGITIMATE DECISIONAL NORMS 
The ultimate criterion for identifying the types of decisional 
norms that the parties to an adjudication regard as legitimate 
is simple and easy to state: a category of norms will be regarded 
as legitimate if it conforms to the expectations of the parties, as 
advised by their lawyers.  This follows in a straightforward 
fashion from the understanding of legitimacy as grounded in 
social practice—in this case, the social practice of the parties 
who have submitted their disputes to adjudication, as advised 
76 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS]. 
77 See id. at 251; see also id. at 147–49, 155–56 (making the point in the 
context of a challenge to anti-contraceptive legislation). 
78 Cf. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 679 
(2005) (concluding that “[i]n practical terms,” judicial legitimacy means “the abil-
ity of courts to secure compliance with their decisions, absent the powers of the 
purse or the sword.”). 
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by their lawyers.  The social practice of lawyers will include a 
complex of expectations about what types of decisional norms 
are appropriate to be used in adjudication.  These understand-
ings will differ from one society to another and from one era to 
another.  But at any particular point in place and time they will 
be reasonably settled and will enjoy a fair degree of consensus 
among those lawyers who are actively engaged in litigation.  As 
my colleague Philip Bobbitt has written, “[t]here is a legal gram-
mar that we all share and that we have all mastered prior to our 
being able to ask what the reasons are for a court having power 
to [act].”79 
The fact that the set of legitimate decisional norms is gen-
erally stable does not mean that change does not take place 
over time—or that future expansion or contraction in the set of 
norms will not occur.  As Frederick Schauer has pointed out, 
new sources of law can emerge at the “boundaries of law” that 
are, at least initially, controversial.80  He cites as an example 
the question whether non-U.S. court decisions, statutes, and 
constitutional provisions should be consulted in determining 
the meaning of open-ended provisions of U.S. law, such as the 
guarantee of due process and the prohibition on the use of 
cruel and unusual punishments.81  Some Justices regard such 
foreign sources as legitimate; others do not.82  One can imagine 
the legitimacy of this form of argument tipping one way or the 
other in the future. 
Although there will be a broad consensus at any time 
about the types of norms that can be called upon to resolve an 
adjudication, the content of these norms may be—and often 
is—disputed.  Thus, it is critical to distinguish between types 
or categories of decisional norms and the content of those 
79 PHILIP  BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1982) 
[hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE]. 
80 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 
2435–36 (2017) (exploring the creation of law through the expansion of “law’s 
boundaries”). 
81 Id. at 2456–57. 
82 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (invoking sup-
port from British and European sources in invalidating sodomy statute), with id. 
at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (condemning reliance on these sources); compare 
also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (listing countries that 
have abolished the death penalty for juveniles), with id. at 868–69 n.4 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (objecting to references to foreign law).  Some scholars argue for non-
conclusive reliance on foreign sources; others question it. See generally Vicki C. 
Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005) (arguing for nonconclusive reliance on foreign sources); 
Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
148 (2005) (questioning even nonconclusive reliance). 
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norms.  To make this concrete, suppose that one category of 
norm regarded as legitimate is following precedent previously 
established by the relevant adjudicative tribunal.  The lawyers 
advising the parties will likely have no quarrel about this gen-
eral proposition.  But they may disagree sharply about which of 
two conflicting precedents is the appropriate authority to 
adopt, or they may agree about the relevant precedent but 
disagree about how it should be interpreted.83  These sorts of 
disagreements are to be expected.  Indeed, they are the source 
of much of the adjudication that results in published opinions 
at the appellate level.  My concern here is not with the particu-
lar content of norms but with identifying the categories of 
norms that are accepted as legitimate by lawyers engaged in 
contemporary American practice before adjudicative tribunals. 
What types of decisional norms will conform to the expec-
tations of lawyers engaged in litigation in various forums in 
contemporary American society?  I argue that five such catego-
ries exist.  Three I describe as robust, meaning that they will be 
regarded as legitimate without regard to their content.  Two I 
regard as qualified, meaning that they will be regarded as legiti-
mate only when there is a very high degree of consensus about 
the content of the norm.  The robust norms consist of argu-
ments based on faithful agent interpretation of a controlling 
text, precedent, and settled practice.  The qualified norms con-
sist of arguments based on moral principles and social welfare. 
A brief word of explanation about each before considering some 
evidence in support of my typology of norms, and how the 
norms interact in the process of justifying the outcome of adju-
dicated disputes.84 
83 See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018) (identifying a key 
precedent and interpreting it one way); id. at 2066–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing that the precedent is key but offering a different interpretation of it). 
84 Arguments from multiple modalities of legitimacy are often criticized as 
lacking a “metaprinciple” to resolve conflicts among the modalities or the problem 
of incommensurability in determining their respective weight. See Michael C. 
Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of 
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1788–94 (1997).  But if the criterion of 
legitimacy is existing social practice of the parties to adjudication, as informed by 
their lawyers, then the expectations of the parties constitute the relevant 
metaprinciple.  The demand for something else shifts the foundation of legitimacy 
from social practice to a different type of legitimacy theory, such as social contract 
theory or moral theory. 
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A. Five Types of Decisional Norms 
Contemporary American legal practice recognizes five types 
of decisional norms that are regarded as legitimate. 85 
1. Faithful Agent Arguments 
The first type of robust decisional norm consists of what I 
will call faithful agent arguments.  These are arguments to the 
effect that the controversy should be resolved in accordance 
with the instructions of the enacting body that authored an 
authoritative text that governs the controversy in question. 
American legal practice recognizes the principle of popular 
sovereignty—the proposition that the people, collectively, are 
the ultimate source of governmental authority.86  Thus, the 
Constitution, through the process of ratification of the original 
document and its amendments, is viewed as having secured 
the consent of the people as the supreme law of the land.  Simi-
lar arguments pertain to state constitutions.  Each of these 
constitutions, federal and state, creates a legislature elected by 
the people of the respective jurisdictions, whose function is to 
enact laws that govern persons living within their respective 
jurisdictions.  Provided such legislated enactments are consis-
tent with the relevant constitution, they are understood as 
commands having secured the (constructive) consent of all per-
sons within the relevant jurisdiction, including adjudicators. 
The adjudicator respects the sovereignty of the enacting body 
only by interpreting its instructions to mean what the enacting 
body intended them to mean.87 
Faithful agent arguments are thus grounded in the pro-
position that the adjudicator is subject to a duty to carry out 
the will of the people and their elected representatives as ex-
85 In a previous essay, I offered a three-part taxonomy of decisional argu-
ments: faithful agent, integrative, and welfarist arguments.  Thomas W. Merrill, 
Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1565, 1566–72 (2010) [hereinafter Merrill, Interpretation].  I did not there ex-
pressly distinguish arguments between precedent and settled practice as different 
forms of integrative interpretation (as I do here), and I lumped moral and social 
welfare arguments together under the heading of welfarist interpretation. Id. at 
1572. 
86 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 7 (1980) (“[W]hatever the explanation, and granting the qualifications, rule 
in accord with the consent of a majority of those governed is the core of the 
American governmental system.”). 
87 See Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS 
ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (“It makes no sense to 
give any person or body lawmaking power unless it is assumed that the law they 
make is the law they intended to make.”). 
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pressed in duly ratified constitutions and enacted legislation. 
This is a straightforward principal/agent mode of argument. 
The people, and derivatively their elected representatives, are 
the principal.  The adjudicator is the agent.  The adjudicator, 
like all other persons within the relevant jurisdiction, is bound 
by the constitution and the enacted laws that have been 
promulgated by the principal.  If lawyers can convince the ad-
judicator that the principal has issued an instruction that 
bears on the controversy, the adjudicator is required to carry 
out that instruction as the faithful agent of the principal. 
There is a very broad consensus among American lawyers 
(and in all liberal democracies) that faithful agent arguments 
are legitimate decisional norms for adjudication.88  Everyone 
agrees that the text of the Constitution and statutes that have 
been duly enacted in the manner set forth in the Constitution 
are legally binding on adjudicators, as they are on everyone 
else in the policy.89  Thus, insofar as there is agreement that a 
particular enacted law has a “plain,” “clear,” or “unambiguous” 
meaning, it supplies a binding norm for resolving the adjudica-
tion.90  This is the powerful core of faithful agent arguments: it 
is always legitimate to resolve a contested adjudication in ac-
cordance with the undisputed meaning of a binding form of 
enacted law. 
There is, of course, less consensus about how to determine 
the meaning of an enacted law when it is not plain, clear, or 
unambiguous.  Legal commentators operating in the faithful 
agent tradition vigorously debate whether it is appropriate to 
determine the instructions contained in enacted law by refer-
ence to the law’s purpose, and if so, at what level of generality. 
And commentators (and some judges) vigorously debate 
whether the legislative history of an enactment should be con-
sulted in trying to discern the meaning of an uncertain law.  It 
88 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (3d ed. 2017) (postulating that textualism, intentionalism 
and purposivism are each “grounded in the principle of legislative supremacy, 
which encapsulates the related ideas that in the U.S. constitutional system, acts 
of Congress enjoy primacy as long as they remain within constitutional bounds, 
and that judges must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”). 
89 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution says as much: “This Constitu-
tion, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof 
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also 
FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 98 (“I know of no case in which the 
Justices have ever suggested that they could reach a decision contrary to the 
Constitution’s requirements.”). 
90 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 35–58 (affirming the bind-
ing nature of formal constitutional rules); cf. STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 7. 
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is not clear, however, that these debates have significantly af-
fected the general legal culture.  Evidence suggests that lower 
courts and lawyers continue to invoke arguments from purpose 
and legislative history, even if these techniques of faithful agent 
interpretation have been condemned by self-proclaimed custo-
dians of originalism and textualism.91  Practicing lawyers and 
judges clearly accept the legitimacy of faithful agent arguments 
but by and large remain eclectic about how those arguments 
are pursued.  Thus, legal practitioners will sometimes stress 
dictionary definitions of the words in the text, sometimes will 
invoke the purpose of the enactment (perhaps with reference to 
its structure), and sometimes will delve into legislative 
history.92 
The important point is that even if questions are earnestly 
debated in academic circles about the proper method of imple-
menting the faithful agent decisional norm, the central pro-
position that the adjudicator must act as the faithful agent of 
the enacting body enjoys a very high degree of consensus in our 
legal culture.  Faithful agent arguments thus conform to the 
general criterion for legitimate decisional norms in adjudica-
tion: they comport with the expectations of the lawyers who 
represent and advise the parties in adjudication. 
2. Arguments from Precedent 
The second robust type of decisional norm consists of ar-
guments from precedent.  Arguments from precedent are ubiq-
91 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the 
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1298, 1324–27 (2018). 
92 American constitutional law is particularly subject to a variety of under-
standings about the “meaning” of the text, some of which bear no resemblance to 
the shared understanding of the text at the time it was ratified. See generally 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for 
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015) (arguing that 
different constitutional provisions have different temporal referents).  For exam-
ple, in Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), the Court interpreted the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as incorporating the equal protection 
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was in turn interpreted as barring 
segregation in public schools.  There was no suggestion that “due process of law” 
had this meaning in 1791, when the Fifth Amendment was adopted.  It is never-
theless striking that the Court nearly always cites some clause in the Constitution 
in support of its decisions.  An exception are its decisions recognizing a broad 
principle of state sovereign immunity that goes beyond the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55 
(1996).  But these decisions have been justified on the ground that such an 
understanding was implicitly assumed by the framers when the Constitution was 
drafted and ratified.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–24 (1999).  Thus, they too 
fall within the scope of the faithful agent argument. 
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uitous in any form of organized human activity.93  “This is the 
way we have done it in the past” is a decisional shortcut used 
all the time, for the simple reason that it would be impossible to 
rethink every step in every collective decisional process every 
time it comes up.94  If you doubt this, consider how matters are 
resolved at faculty meetings, or at any type of meeting by a 
board of directors or trustees.  Precedent following is especially 
entrenched in American legal culture, given the prominence 
accorded to the common law in the first-year curriculum in law 
schools and the dominance of the case method of instruction 
even in courses about constitutional law and legislation.  Un-
surprisingly, then, arguments from precedent form a second 
robust norm used by adjudicators in resolving disputes.95 
Historically, arguments from precedent have been closely 
associated with private law, where common law has played a 
prominent role.  In recent decades, however, private law has 
become increasingly dominated by statutes, including uniform 
laws, model state laws, and federal and state regulatory enact-
ments.  Meanwhile, amendments to the Constitution and to 
many framework statutes have become increasingly difficult to 
obtain.  With the “statutorification” of private law96 and 
gridlock afflicting public law, arguments from precedent have 
receded in private law and have surged to the fore in public law. 
This is especially pronounced in federal constitutional law, 
where nearly every contested case is resolved by following, dis-
tinguishing, or qualifying existing precedent.97  David Strauss 
93 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987) (“Reli-
ance on precedent is part of life in general.”). 
94 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 96 (2010) 
[originally published 1921] (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to 
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”). 
95 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the 
Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1129–30 (2008) 
[hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Precedent] (“So far as I am aware, no Justice up 
through and including those currently sitting has persistently questioned the 
legitimacy of stare decisis or failed to apply it in some cases.”). 
96 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). 
97 See, e.g., Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative 
Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 764 (2002) 
(noting that “arguments from precedent vastly outnumber all other kinds of argu-
ments in attorneys’ written briefs, the Court’s written opinions, and the [J]ustices’ 
arguments in conference discussions.”); see also Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The 
Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1025, 1030 (1996) (providing 
empirical data).  When the foundational legal authority is some form of enacted 
law, as opposed to common law, the relevant precedents are those that have 
resolved how the text in question (or a similar text) has been interpreted in the 
past.  Nevertheless, the conventions that govern the use of precedent in resolving 
interpretational questions are closely similar to, and appear to have been bor-
rowed from, those originally developed in the common law context. 
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has persuasively argued that precedent has almost entirely 
displaced original meaning argument in construing the federal 
Constitution, the main body of which is now 230 years old.98 
Arguments from precedent are also increasingly prevalent in 
cases governed by statute, especially where the statute has 
been around for a long time and has been frequently litigated. 
In general, the older the text, and the more frequently it has 
been interpreted in the past, the greater the likelihood that we 
will find legal argumentation based on precedent, rather than 
interpretation of the instructions of the enacting body.  Public 
law, and especially constitutional law, has become the new 
common law. 
The theoretical literature on precedent following is rela-
tively thin compared to the extensive literature on faithful 
agent interpretation.  This is unfortunate, given the prominent 
role that precedent plays in modern American public law.  One 
proposition about precedent, however, enjoys general consen-
sus: if a controlling precedent is perceived to be indistinguish-
able from the case at hand, that precedent must be followed 
unless there is a “special justification” for overruling it.99  This 
is analogous to the proposition that the adjudicator is obliged 
to enforce an enacted law whose meaning is “plain.”  Admit-
tedly, lawyers and adjudicators show considerable ingenuity in 
arguing that precedents either are or are not distinguisha-
ble.100  Precedent by its nature has an accordion-like quality, 
allowing it to be either broadly or narrowly characterized in 
later adjudications.101  And if no precedent is directly on point, 
lawyers and adjudicators are free to argue that other prece-
dents either should or should not be extended by analogy. 
Considered more abstractly, lawyers and adjudicators argue 
that precedents reflect embedded rules, and the hypothesized 
98 STRAUSS, supra note 11. 
99 See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2404 (2015).  The 
percentage of precedents that are overruled, although not negligible, is actually 
quite small.  A recent empirical study puts it at 3%–4% of all Supreme Court 
precedent.  Lee Epstein et al., The Decision to Depart (or Not) from Constitutional 
Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1141 
(2015).  The study further finds that there is no appreciable difference between 
statutory and constitutional precedent in this regard, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that stare decisis is weaker in constitutional cases. Id. 
100 See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–2 (1949) (devel-
oping the point that the following court determines the meaning of the precedent 
court, giving the system of precedent considerable room for evolution). 
101 See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 734. 
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rules can be characterized in different ways.102  Considerable 
ingenuity is on display in arguing for broader or narrower char-
acterizations of the embedded rule. 
The legal conventions that govern arguments from prece-
dent defy easy formulation, and are learned by lawyers and 
adjudicators through emulation of what other adjudicators do. 
At any given point in the evolution of the legal culture, there 
will be limits on what is regarded as acceptable in the way of 
using precedent, although these limits will be hard to define.103 
In the normative section of the Article, I will criticize a form of 
precedential argument that appears to be taking hold in the 
Supreme Court, which I call Scrabble Board precedentialism. 
The important point for present purposes is that there is a 
broad consensus in our legal culture that indistinguishable 
precedents must be followed unless overruled and that argu-
ments by analogy from precedent are a legitimate source of 
decisional norms in adjudication.  Arguments from precedent 
thus comport with the expectations of the lawyers who re-
present parties in adjudications and conform to the general 
criterion for legitimate decisional norms. 
3. Arguments from Settled Practice 
My third type of robust decisional norm is argument from 
settled practice.  Arguments from settled practice are not al-
ways identified as such but are encountered quite frequently. 
They include the settled practices of courts, of other branches 
of government, and of the institutions of society more generally. 
Once we identify them as a discrete category of argument, we 
can see that they enjoy widespread support and thus qualify as 
a robust. 
Settled practice plays a large role in constitutional law, far 
more than is commonly acknowledged.  The very practice of 
102 See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989) 
(arguing that the constraining force of precedent comes from rules embedded in 
decisions justifying outcomes). 
103 Consider Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, a case involving 
surface subsidence from mining of bituminous coal, where the majority declined 
to follow a precedent (from the same state, Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922)) involving surface subsidence from mining anthracite coal.  480 U.S. 470, 
474 (1987).  The majority did not argue that the earlier decisions was distinguish-
able from the present one because it involved mining anthracite rather than 
bituminous coal—that would have been regarded as silly given that subsurface 
mining in both cases posed similar risks of surface subsidence.  Instead, the 
majority argued that the doctrinal framework had changed from that applied in 
the earlier decision. Id. at 485.  The dissent regarded the factual similarity to be 
controlling. Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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judicial review is not mentioned in the constitutional text.  It is 
commonly justified by citation to precedent—Marbury v. 
Madison104—but the adequacy of the argument for judicial re-
view set forth in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion has long been 
questioned.105  The strongest justification, as Charles Black 
wrote, rests on “the visible, active, and long-continued acquies-
cence of Congress in the Court’s performance of this func-
tion.”106  In other words, judicial review is constitutional 
because it is part of settled practice. 
Settled practice appears in many other guises in constitu-
tional law.  Separation of powers disputes are often resolved by 
invoking the shared understandings of the political 
branches107 and has recently been invoked in the voting rights 
context.108  Even general societal practices often count in con-
stitutional law, as under the Fourth Amendment, with its invo-
cation of reasonable expectations of privacy109 and in 
substantive due process cases that rely on practices “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”110  Michael 
104 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
105 See, e.g., BICKEL, LEAST  DANGEROUS, supra note 76, at 2–14 (noting that 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion addresses the easy question whether the Consti-
tution is binding law but ignores the hard question whether the courts are entitled 
to exercise independent judgment in its interpretation); William W. Van Alstyne, A 
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 6–33 (discussing a num-
ber of questionable aspects of the decision). 
106 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 
(1969). 
107 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 433–35 (2012) (interbranch consensus); 
Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 
1620–31 (2014) (similar); David E. Pozen, Self Help and the Separation of Powers, 
124 YALE L.J. 2, 34–39 (2014) (discussing a variety of separation of powers con-
ventions).  To cite a recent example, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 132 S. Ct. 2550, 
2567 (2014), the Court interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause to allow 
presidents to make temporary appointments even when a vacancy exists before 
the Senate goes into recess, relying in significant part on an unbroken practice 
going back seventy five years. 
108 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1129 (2016) (relying in significant part 
on settled practice in interpreting “eligible voters” for voting rights purposes). 
109 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215–16 (2018); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967). 
110 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 703, 721 (1977) (citing Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).  The Court of 
course has been inconsistent in this regard, invoking settled practice to reject a 
constitutional right to state-assisted suicide, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 706, but 
ignoring settled practice in creating a right to abortion and same-sex marriage. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596–97 (2015); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 116 (1973). 
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Gerhardt has collected a number of other examples, which he 
calls “nonjudicial precedent.”111 
Invocation of settled practice as a decisional norm is hardly 
limited to constitutional law.  It plays a large role in the com-
mon law, where it is usually referred to as “custom.”  Black-
stone argued that the common law originated in the general 
customs of the realm which have been followed from time im-
memorial.112  Whether or not this is generally true, there is no 
doubt that the very idea of a common law, based on courts 
following their own prior decisions, is itself grounded on noth-
ing more than settled practice.  “[T]his rule was never ‘made’ by 
any explicit enactment; it is a part of the customary rules gov-
erning the actions of courts.”113  With respect to the content of 
the common law, Melvin Eisenberg has argued that usages or 
“experiential propositions” have always been a factor in shap-
ing its development.  A usage can take on a normative aspect, 
he argues, when it “generates an expectation that it will 
continue.”114 
Perhaps the most widely referenced types of argument from 
settled practice are canons of interpretation.  Many of these can 
be characterized as “linguistic” canons (like expressio 
unius),115 and as such can be justified as part of the package of 
interpretational tools that fall under the faithful agent rubric. 
Other canons (such as the doctrine of lenity) can be justified as 
devices for implementing particular constitutional norms and 
thus can also be assimilated to faithful agent argument.  Yet 
there remains a residual set of canons that can be justified only 
111 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 111–46 (2008) (collecting 
examples).  As in the case of precedent, arguments from settled practice come in 
different versions.  One version, which is relatively restrictive, would limit the use 
of settled practice to situations in which the meaning of the text of the Constitu-
tion is unclear, multiple branches of government have deliberated about the cor-
rect answer, and both the branches and the general public have acquiesced in 
this meaning. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2019) (developing this conception).  Another and weaker form would simply re-
quire a longstanding practice that has been allowed to persist without significant 
challenge. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
112 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67. 
113 FULLER, ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 46–47. 
114 EISENBERG, supra note 35, at 37. 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“Where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).  The full maxim is expressio unius est 
exclusio alterus (the expression of one implies exclusion of the other). Expressio 
Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 34 25-AUG-20 10:15
R
1428 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1395 
because of long-standing usage—such as the canon that later 
enactments prevail over earlier enactments if they cannot be 
reconciled, the Charming Betsy canon counseling avoidance of 
conflict with international law, the canon enjoining courts to 
interpret statutes in favor of Indian tribes, the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of statutes, and various 
doctrines in administrative law.116  Whatever their justifica-
tion, adjudicators (including self-proclaimed textualists) show 
no hesitation about applying these canons in resolving dis-
putes over interpretation.117  The unstated reason for doing so 
is that the canons are part of the settled practice of adjudica-
tors and as such are legitimate. 
Several commentators have discussed a phenomenon 
called “superprecedent,” meaning, roughly, precedent that has 
virtually no chance of being overturned.118  Superprecedent, in 
my view, is simply precedent that has become part of settled 
practice.119  Richard Fallon cites as examples of super-
precedent decisions upholding the Social Security Act and the 
use of paper currency as legal tender.120  These decisions owe 
their immunity from overruling not to the quality of their rea-
soning, but because they have given rise to settled practices 
that have generated enormous reliance interests.  The Social 
Security system—and for that matter the entire administrative 
state—is not going to be overturned even if historical evidence 
116 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) 
(stating that there is a presumption against extraterritorial application of stat-
utes); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (explaining that a prior statute 
is presumed repealed by inconsistent later statute); Murray v. Schooner Charm-
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that statutes are to be con-
strued if possible as consistent with the law of nations). 
117 See generally, Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful 
Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109 (2010) (discussing the historical use of substantive 
canons and the tension with textualist beliefs). 
118 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2006) (“[B]edrock precedents—precedents that have 
become the foundation for large areas of important doctrine.”); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205–06 (2006) (“Super prece-
dents are the constitutional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable 
issue for courts to decide . . . .”); Michael Sinclair, Precedent, SuperPrecedent, 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 365 (2007) (“To say a case is a  superprecedent means it 
is judicially unshakeable . . . .”). 
119 See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1735 (2013) (“The force of these cases [superprecedent] derives 
from the people, who have taken their validity off the Court’s agenda.”); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1293 (2008) 
(“[T]he point at which a well-settled practice becomes, by virtue of being well-
settled, practically immune to reconsideration is the point at which that precedent 
has become a superprecedent.”). 
120 Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note 95, at 1113, 1150. 
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conclusively shows that it violates the original understanding 
of the framers about scope of federal power.  This is because 
the Social Security system has been integrated into the warp 
and woof of American society, with millions of individuals and 
institutions organizing their lives and practices around it.121 
This suggests that arguments from settled practice may be, if 
anything, more powerful than arguments from precedent. 
suspect that precedent is invoked more commonly than settled 
practice primarily because it is more accessible to lawyers and 
adjudicators; proving settled practice, if it is not so obvious as 
to be susceptible of judicial notice, requires expert testimony, 
which is more costly. 
The ultimate justification for using settled practice as a 
decisional norm, of course, is that this is congruent with the 
expectations of parties to an adjudication.  No litigant can 
claim surprise—disappointment, maybe, but not surprise— 
when a court rebuffs efforts to upend settled practices. 
4. Moral Arguments 
I come now to two types of argument that I regard as more 
qualified, in the sense that they depend on agreement about 
the content of the norm.  Moral arguments have been regarded 
by certain commentators, most prominently Ronald Dworkin, 
as being the ultimate touchstone of legitimate adjudication.122 
This, I believe, mischaracterizes existing norms of legal prac-
tice.  It is true that moral arguments—including references to 
fairness, equity, and good faith—appear with some frequency 
in adjudicated decisions.123  But they often appear in a sup-
porting role, after arguments from original meaning, precedent, 
and settled practice have been canvassed.124  Moral arguments 
are generally designed to reinforce the conclusion reached on 
121 Even Judge Bork, often regarded as a leading spokesman for originalism, 
wrote that “[n]o judge would dream” of overruling precedents that violate the 
original understanding if they have become “embedded in the life of the nation 
. . . . accepted by the society . . . [and] fundamental to the private and public 
expectations of individuals and institutions.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158 (1990). 
122 RONALD  DWORKIN, LAW’S  EMPIRE 410–11 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
EMPIRE]. 
123 See Jules L. Coleman, Constraints on the Criteria of Legality, 6 LEGAL THE-
ORY 171, 171 (2000) (“No one denies that moral principles figure in legal argument 
and practice.”). 
124 Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 
1942 (2004) (“Policy and principle appear before us when the law runs out, and 
also when the results the law generates even when it has not run out seem 
extremely, and not just somewhat, unwise as a matter of policy or extremely, and 
not just a little bit, unjust as a matter of morality.”). 
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the basis of these more robust forms of argument, not to stand 
alone as a primary ground for decision.  As Melvin Eisenberg 
has concluded: 
[C]ourts do not have a legislative discretion to establish the 
rules they think best on the basis of the moral norms and 
policies they think best.  Rather, they can properly establish 
legal rules only by employing doctrinal and social proposi-
tions that have the requisite degree of support, in the manner 
required by the institutional principles of adjudication.125 
To be sure, one can occasionally find decisions that seem 
to turn entirely on moral arguments.  A good example is a deci-
sion discussed by Dworkin, which he calls Elmer’s Case.126 
Elmer was a young man who murdered his grandfather in or-
der to secure an inheritance.  Although the New York statute of 
wills contained no exception for such cases, the majority disal-
lowed the inheritance, invoking the equitable maxim that no 
person should be allowed to profit from his wrong.127  Note, 
however, that the moral norm invoked in this case is one that 
enjoys an extraordinarily high degree of consensus.  I suspect 
that there would be no dissent from the proposition that it is 
morally wrong to murder someone to secure an inheritance. 
Elmer’s Case thus shows that an adjudication can be consid-
ered legitimate, even if it cannot be justified by one or more 
robust norms, if it rests on moral reasoning that enjoys a very 
high degree of consensus.128 
125 EISENBERG, supra note 35, at 151.  Whether adjudicators can invoke moral 
norms in support of decisions is related to the question whether the English 
practice of interpreting statutes in light of precepts of equity carried over to Ameri-
can courts. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–104 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early 
Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1082–86 (2001); John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of 
Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1672–80 
(2001) [hereinafter Manning, Deriving Rules]. Whatever the original understand-
ing of the “judicial power,” I agree with Manning that the Marshall Court marked a 
decisive turn away from this practice in matters of statutory interpretation, in 
favor of faithful agent interpretation. Id. at 1651. Nevertheless, an echo of this 
tradition remains, primarily in the form of observations about the fairness or 
justness of particular decisions principally justified on other grounds. 
126 DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 122, at 15–20 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 
N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)). 
127 Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190. 
128 By interpreting existing decisional norms to include moral norms that 
enjoy a high degree of consensus, this article can be said to embrace a version of 
what has been called “inclusive” or “soft” positivism. See generally, JULES L. 
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY 103–19 (2001) (distinguishing “inclusive” positivism from “exclusive” posi-
tivism); see also HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 355–70 (Jules Coleman, ed., 2001) (essays by Stephen R. 
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Moral norms that are actively contested are unlikely to 
provide a legitimate basis for an adjudication, at least not on a 
stand-alone basis.  Consider in this regard the contrasting 
fates of two of the Supreme Court’s most notable decisions, 
Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade.129  At the time 
they were decided, neither decision was securely grounded in 
arguments based on original meaning, precedent, or settled 
practice.  Racial integration of public schools was rapidly be-
coming an accepted norm in northern states but not in the 
south.130 Brown was justified by the Court largely on the basis 
of a social welfare argument—that segregation impaired the 
educational progress of black children.131  Given that the man-
date to integrate public schools was inconsistent with social 
practice in the south, the decision met with strong resistance 
in that part of the country, and remained largely unenforced 
until reinforced by legislation and federal threats of funding 
cutoffs more than a decade later.132  Today, racial segregation 
is universally condemned as morally unacceptable, in all parts 
of the country.  Any person who questions the legitimacy of 
Brown or denies that it is settled law would be denied confirma-
tion to public office.133  This is because racial equality has be-
come a moral norm enjoying strong consensual support. 
Roe met a very different fate.  Although, like Brown, it was 
weakly grounded in robust decisional norms, Roe was quickly 
hailed by one segment of society as a decision of great moral 
significance because it reinforced the reproductive autonomy of 
Perry, Brian Leiter, Liam Murphy, and Jeremy Waldron). The version of inclusive 
positivism advanced here (if that is what it is) is limited by the qualification that 
only moral norms that enjoy a high degree of social consensus can serve, by 
themselves, as a ground for decision by an adjudicator.  The same qualification 
applies to social welfare arguments. 
129 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
130 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM  JIM  CROW TO  CIVIL  RIGHTS: THE  SUPREME 
COURT AND THE  STRUGGLE FOR  RACIAL  EQUALITY 291, 292–313 (2004) (noting that 
when Brown was argued, “racial segregation in public grade schools remained 
completely intact in the southern and border states and in the District of Colum-
bia” and documenting that Justices from northern states, where segregation was 
breaking down or increasingly regarded as immoral, were initially more receptive 
to the ruling in Brown than were the Justices from southern or border states). 
131 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 & n.11. 
132 See  KLARMAN, supra note 130, at 389–99; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 94–100 (1991). 
133 Cf. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life 
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1840 (2016) (noting that 
early versions of originalism that were hard to reconcile with Brown were “jet-
tisoned in part to ‘make originalism safe for Brown’” (quoting Jed Rubenfeld, 
Reply to Commentators, 115 YALE L.J. 2093, 2098 (2006))). 
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women.  At the same time, however, another segment of society 
believes with equal intensity that the decision sanctions a form 
of infanticide.  No consensus has yet emerged resolving this 
controversy.134  Unless and until it does, the legitimacy of Roe 
and follow-on abortion decisions must be based on the ground 
that abortion rights have become part of settled practice.135 
5. Social Welfare Arguments 
Social welfare arguments seek to justify decisions based on 
their consequences.  Like moral arguments, social welfare ar-
guments have their champions as the ultimate touchstone for 
legitimate adjudication, two jurists, Judge Richard Posner and 
Justice Stephen Breyer, being the most notable examples in 
this instance.136  Both argue that the ultimate criterion for 
judging in an adjudication should be “pragmatism,” meaning 
essentially doing the most to enhance aggregate social wel-
fare.137  But these views are outliers.  The notion that adjudica-
tors should always exercise their discretion to promote social 
welfare greatly overstates the role of social welfare arguments 
in the social practice of adjudication. 
Social welfare arguments, like moral arguments, tend to 
play a supporting role in justifying judgments.  A good illustra-
tion is the law of qualified immunity in civil actions brought 
against state officials for violating constitutional rights in ac-
tions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  One can find state-
ments in these cases about the need for immunity to prevent 
“dampen[ing] the ardor” of public officials.138  But as a recent 
assessment concludes, “the Court has used more traditional 
134 Cf. Public Opinion on Abortion, PEW RESEARCH CENTER RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 
(Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abor-
tion/ [https://perma.cc/S7MA-Z394] (reporting that 61% of the public believes 
that abortion should be legal in most or all cases and 38% of the public believes 
that abortion should be illegal in most or all cases). 
135 See Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note 95, at 1116 (“[A] decision 
as fiercely and enduringly contested as Roe v. Wade has acquired no immunity 
from serious judicial reconsideration . . . .”). 
136 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
75–87 (2010) (comparing originalism and legal pragmatism); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 57–96 (2003) [hereinafter POSNER, PRAGMATISM] 
(discussing legal pragmatism and pragmatic adjudication broadly).  Although 
Justice Breyer does not commonly identify himself as a pragmatist, many com-
mentators have done so. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic 
Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 1720 (2006). 
137 See BREYER, supra note 136, at 80–87; POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 136, 
at 59–60. 
138 E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. 
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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legal arguments as the opening wedge for these policy con-
cerns.”139  One can speculate that the “policy concerns” may in 
fact carry more weight with the Justices than the traditional 
legal arguments.  But the fact remains that in justifying the 
legitimacy of its decisions, policy takes a back seat to legal 
arguments. 
The same pattern predominates even in common law adju-
dication.  One can of course perceive social welfare arguments 
in common law adjudication, as in the emergence of strict lia-
bility in tort for manufacturers of defective products, where 
early decisions cited concerns about the superior ability of 
manufacturers to spread the costs of accidents.140  But aca-
demic writings that urge a more general use of explicitly 
welfarist concepts, such as the “Hand formula,” have found few 
adherents, other than former academics named to the 
bench.141 
A pervasive concern about invoking social welfare as a rea-
son for resolving particular adjudicated disputes is the compe-
tence of adjudicators to make accurate assessments of the 
welfare consequences of different decisional rules.  Compara-
tive institutional analysis would suggest that legislatures, and 
even more plausibly administrative agencies, have better fact 
finding and analytical capacities in assessing the welfare ef-
fects of decisional norms than do courts and other types of 
adjudicators.142  There is also a concern about the variability of 
assessments of social welfare over time, as new information 
emerges and social values change.  Adjudicators are supposed 
to apply objective decisional norms that conform to the expec-
tations of the parties, as advised by their lawyers.143  There is 
an inherent tension between applying settled norms and ad-
justing policy based on the latest social science or policy pre-
scriptions.  Consequently only social welfare norms that enjoy 
a strong consensus can provide a basis for legitimate adjudica-
tion on a stand-alone basis. 
139 William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 79 
(2018). 
140 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS 39 (1970) (noting that loss spreading was the justification most often cited 
among early legal writers advocating for strict liability in products cases). 
141 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evi-
dence from Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 680 (2010) 
(finding little evidence that judges other than Judge Posner rely on the Hand 
formula in deciding torts cases). 
142 ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 208–11, 213 (2006). 
143 See supra Part I. 
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B. Support for the Typology 
Any assertion about the structure of legitimate argument 
in adjudication cries out for supporting evidence.  This is inher-
ently difficult to develop, given the practice by adjudicators of 
blending different types of argument in justifying individual 
adjudications (discussed below) and the difficulty of defining 
the types of argument in easily measured terms.144  I offer here 
two types of evidence, approaching the problem from different 
ends of the adjudication spectrum and using very different 
methodologies.  The first is a thought experiment based on how 
a nonspecialized legal advisor would respond to a request to 
represent a party in an arbitration.  The second draws on typol-
ogies of arguments used in Supreme Court decisions, as devel-
oped by close observers of the Court’s practice. 
1. A Thought Experiment 
Consider the following hypothetical.  You are a law profes-
sor at a university that has an honor code.145  The honor code 
sets forth a number of behaviors that will be deemed to violate 
the code, including plagiarism.  Students who are accused of 
violating the code must appear before an honor code tribunal, 
consisting of students appointed for this purpose.  The case 
against the accused is presented by a law professor who is 
appointed to that role.  Accused students are represented by 
another law professor, typically appointed one case at a time.  A 
student, call him Peter, has been accused of plagiarism by a 
classroom instructor.  The charge is based on the instructor’s 
discovery (using analytical software) that a term paper submit-
ted by Peter included three strings of words, each consisting of 
five to eight words and less than a complete sentence, that are 
identical to strings of words found in an open-source internet 
site that includes a discussion of the same topic.  The term 
paper contains no quotations marks around the words nor 
does it include any citation to the internet site.  You have been 
appointed to defend Peter against the charge of plagiarism 
before the honor code tribunal. 
144 See infra subpart III.C. 
145 For representative examples of honor codes, see, e.g., see, e.g., Procedures 
for Student Discipline, COLUM. L. SCH. § 7, https://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
academic-rules/student-discipline#3 [https://perma.cc/68QC-EX8V] (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2020); The Student Judicial Charter of 1997, STAN.: OFF. COMMU-
NITY STANDARDS § 3, https://communitystandards.stanford.edu/policies-and-
guidance/student-judicial-charter-1997#judicial [https://perma.cc/7J33-XXJJ] 
(last updated Oct. 2013). 
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Although there may be factual issues that warrant investi-
gation, the principal issue here is a legal one: Does the replica-
tion of three short strings of words from an internet site, 
without attribution, constitute plagiarism within the meaning 
of the honor code?  This is your first foray as a representative of 
an accused student before the honor code tribunal.  The ques-
tion is: How would you proceed in developing a legal defense of 
Peter against the charge of plagiarism? 
As a member of the legal community, presumptively social-
ized into the practices of that community, I submit that you 
would proceed as follows.  The first thing you would do would 
be to review the language of the honor code.  How does it define 
plagiarism?  Is it possible to argue that Peter’s conduct does 
not fall within the definition?  Is there other language in the 
code, such as a characterization of offending behavior as “seri-
ous” or “significant” that might be employed to characterize 
Peter’s conduct as de minimis?  You might also review any 
documents accompanying the promulgation of the code, or per-
haps previous iterations of the code, to see if there is any lan-
guage that might be used to characterize Peter’s conduct as 
something that the enactors of the code would not have re-
garded as sufficiently serious to warrant a finding of a violation. 
In short, the first thing you would do would be to explore poten-
tial faithful agent arguments that could be deployed to Peter’s 
advantage. 
You quickly discover that the honor code tribunal follows a 
practice of issuing written decisions in resolving honor code 
cases and that a collection of these decisions going back sev-
eral decades is publicly available.  The next thing you would do 
would be to flip through these decisions, looking for any that 
involve charges of plagiarism.  It turns out there are quite a few. 
You will want to identify those most closely on point to see how 
they resolved the charge and what reasons they gave for their 
resolution.  You will want to develop, if possible, an argument 
that prior honor code cases support an acquittal of Peter, or at 
least warrant a relatively lenient sanction.  You intuit that the 
honor code tribunal will want to resolve Peter’s case in a man-
ner consistent with the way previous tribunals have resolved 
cases in order to assure predictability and equal treatment over 
time.  As should be obvious, this will constitute an argument 
based on precedent. 
After that, it is unclear how you would proceed.  If faithful 
agent arguments and arguments from precedent are sufficient 
to make out a decent case in support of Peter, perhaps you 
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would stop at this point.  If these primary sources leave the 
matter up in the air, or they suggest things are not looking good 
for Peter, you might press further.  One possibility would be to 
canvas various professors about how they respond to evidence 
of copying of short strings of words from internet sites.  Per-
haps an informal norm has developed at the university that 
regards these sorts of copying as not worth charging as viola-
tions.  Alternatively, it might make sense to gather information 
about how other institutions of higher learning define plagia-
rism.  Perhaps some kind of general norm or rule of thumb can 
be identified which can be characterized as a settled practice 
among such institutions in dealing with charges of plagiarism. 
If Peter would be exonerated under the settled practice followed 
by similar institutions, this will likely carry significant weight 
with the honor code tribunal. 
If all else fails, you might explore various moral arguments 
that could render Peter more sympathetic or give cause for an 
exculpatory excuse for his behavior.  Perhaps his instructor 
encouraged students to explore information on the internet, or 
perhaps Peter thought that because the site was an open 
source, ordinary rules against copying did not apply.  Conceiv-
ably, similar arguments could be couched in social welfare 
terms: students should be encouraged to use the internet, cut-
ting and pasting from electronic sources has become routine 
behavior, and on balance this should be encouraged, etc. 
This thought experiment is obviously open to contestation. 
Others may have a different view about how they would pro-
ceed in developing arguments in the hypothetical adjudication. 
If my conjectures are plausible, however, they provide some 
evidence in support of the classification of legitimate forms of 
argument I have set forth. 
2. Typologies of Supreme Court Arguments 
A second source of support comes from various attempts to 
classify the types of arguments relied upon by the much-stud-
ied Supreme Court in resolving contested cases.  Philip Bobbitt 
has developed perhaps the best known typology, in his book 
Constitutional Fate.146  Based on a review of Court decisions 
over the course of time he discerns six modalities of argument: 
historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethi-
146 BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79; see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION 12–13 (1991) (restating and analyzing the modalities he identified in 
Constitutional Fate). 
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cal.147  Although I do not agree with everything Bobbitt says 
about the modalities of argument, there is at least a substantial 
overlap with my classification.  Bobbitt’s historical, textual and 
structural arguments I would group together as different forms 
of faithful agent argument.148  His doctrinal category corre-
sponds to my argument from precedent.149  His ethical argu-
ment corresponds to my moral argument.150  And his 
prudential argument resonates with my social welfare argu-
ment.151  The only thing missing from Bobbitt’s account but 
present in mine is argument from settled practice, although 
there are elements of this in his account of structural argument 
and ethical argument.152 
Another notable effort at developing a typology of argument 
in constitutional cases is found in an early article by Richard 
Fallon.153  He discerns five modalities of argument: text, histor-
ical intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and values.154 
Here too I do not agree with everything he says.  By constitu-
tional theory, Fallon refers to theories like John Ely’s represen-
tation-reinforcing theory or theories about the purpose of 
protecting freedom of speech.155  Theories in this sense are 
surely part of academic literature about constitutional inter-
pretation, but I see little evidence, and Fallon cites none, that 
147 BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 7, 93. 
148 See id. at 9, 26, 74; supra subsection II.A.1.  To be clear, Bobbitt regards 
textual arguments as permitting arguments about present meaning of the text, 
rather than the meaning it had at the time of ratification. Id. at 26.  I agree that 
faithful agent arguments often proceed as if the current meaning of the text is 
controlling; this is especially common in statutory interpretation cases.  But this 
is probably based on an unexamined assumption that the meaning of the words 
has not changed.  If perchance the current meaning and the original meaning 
have diverged (this is rare), a faithful agent is required to adopt the original, not 
the current meaning.  The current meaning could be adopted only on the under-
standing that the enacting body, by choosing open-ended language, had delegated 
authority to future interpreters to give content to the words in an evolving, com-
mon-law fashion.  For a suggestion along these lines, see Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40–46 (1985). 
149 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 40; supra subsection II.A.2. 
150 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 93–94; supra subsection II.A.4. 
151 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 61; supra subsection II.A.5. 
152 See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 84 (stating it would be “absurd” 
to undo a settled understanding about the President’s right to remove executive 
officers without congressional consent); id. at 96–97 (treating decisions that pro-
tect family units long recognized by settled tradition as a form of ethical argu-
ment); supra subsection III.A.3. 
153 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructivist]. 
154 Id. at 1194–1209. 
155 Id. at 1200–02 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–9, 73–104 (1980)). 
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they have been relied upon by courts in resolving discrete con-
stitutional cases or that lawyers regard them as the kinds of 
arguments that would carry weight with courts or other adjudi-
cators.  Fallon’s invocation of text and historical intent I would 
lump together under faithful agent arguments.  By “values” 
Fallon means both moral values and arguments based on so-
cial welfare.156  So in the end, Fallon’s taxonomy differs from 
mine only in its introduction of a non-factor (constitutional 
theory) and in his omission of arguments from settled practice, 
which may have taken on greater prominence in the years since 
he wrote. 
Jack Balkin has offered a third and more complex menu of 
constitutional arguments.  Balkin is a “new originalist,” some-
one who believes that that the Constitution must be inter-
preted according to its original meaning, but when its meaning 
is unclear or when it must be applied to circumstances not 
addressed by the text, it is necessary to engage in “constitu-
tional construction.”157  In recent work Balkin has offered a list 
of arguments which he believes are widely accepted by the legal 
profession for engaging in this process of constitutional con-
struction.158  Drawing on traditional studies of rhetoric, he 
calls these arguments topoi or “topics.”159  The list is comprised 
of arguments from text, structure, purpose, consequences, ju-
dicial precedent, political convention, custom, natural law or 
natural rights, national ethos, political tradition, and honored 
authority.160  Once again, there is substantial overlap with my 
156 See Fallon, Constructivist, supra note 153, at 1204–09. 
157 See Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145, 145–46 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, 
Topics].  The strategy of dividing constitutional law into “constitutional interpreta-
tion” and “constitutional construction” can be credited to Lawrence Solum. See, 
e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 453, 457 (2013).  This strategy seems designed primarily to allow all 
modes of argument in constitutional law to be assimilated to “originalism.” Id.  I 
do not consider the distinction because so far it has not entered into the discourse 
of lawyers and courts. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 13–15 (2012) (“[The] supposed distinction between 
interpretation and construction has never reflected the courts’ actual usage.”).  The 
perceived imperative to cloak all constitutional decisions in the mantle of original-
ism may be related to heightened anxiety about policymaking in the name of the 
Constitution, given the great age of the document and the very low probability of 
its being amended any time soon. See Thomas W. Merrill, Interpreting an 
Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547, 559–60 (2018) [hereinafter Merrill, 
Unamendable Text]. 
158 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 641, 660 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, New Originalism]; Balkin, Topics, 
supra note 157, at 181–83. 
159 Balkin, Topics, supra note 157, at 181. 
160 Id. at 181–82. 
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categories.  I would lump text, structure, and purpose together 
as modes of faithful agent argument; judicial precedent is 
clearly the same as my category of precedent; political conven-
tion, political tradition and custom I would group together as 
types of argument from settled practice; natural law or natural 
rights I would classify as types of moral argument; and conse-
quences I would call social welfare arguments.161  So in the 
main, the differences between Balkin’s account and my ac-
count here relate to taxonomy rather than substantive disa-
greement.  Balkin is surely right that one can find appeals to 
national ethos and honored authority in opinions, but I regard 
these “topics” as rhetorical flourishes supporting decisions 
reached primarily on other grounds, rather than as indepen-
dent grounds of decision. 
A number of other esteemed commentators have recog-
nized that courts are guided by multiple decisional norms re-
garded as legitimate, including William Baude, Michael Dorf, 
Kent Greenawalt, Henry Monaghan, Robert Post, and Richard 
Primus.162  These accounts are less comprehensive than those 
of Bobbitt, Fallon, and Balkin, so I do not discuss them here. 
But they too are not significantly inconsistent with the typology 
I have offered. 
C. Mixing and Matching 
One frustrating aspect of changing the focus from legiti-
mate interpretation to legitimate adjudication is that adjudica-
tors are resolutely eclectic in their use of justifying arguments. 
In common law cases, courts will concentrate on precedent but 
may throw in arguments from settled practice, supplemented 
with observations sounding in morality or social welfare.  In 
statutory cases, arguments from text and structure are likely to 
be reinforced by arguments from legislative history, precedent, 
settled practice, and perhaps even morality and social welfare. 
In constitutional cases, precedent will dominate, with occa-
sional references to originalist sources, morality or social wel-
fare, and in some contexts settled practice will appear.  In 
short, adjudicators mix and match different modalities of argu-
ment in justifying their selection of decisional norms.  As Bob-
161 See id. at 181–83; supra subsections II.A.1–5. 
162 See Baude, supra note 4, at 2403–04; Dorf, supra note 84, at 1788; Green-
awalt, supra note 49, at 659–60; Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 756, 763 (1988); Robert C. Post, 
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 YALE L. SCH. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 
13, 19, 21, 23 (1990); Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 183–84 (2008). 
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bitt observes, “The various arguments . . . often work in 
combination.”163  Fallon insightfully notes that in practice, the 
different modalities of argument are often deployed in such a 
way as to reinforce the result reached by the adjudicator.164 
This mixing and matching is no doubt an artifact of the 
way adjudicated controversies are litigated and decided.  The 
lawyers for the contesting parties will develop rival “theories of 
the case” which purport to integrate or synthesize different 
argumentative sources.165  The adjudicator, if worth her salt, 
will adopt one or the other of these theories or perhaps a syn-
thesis of the theories as her own.  Again we see how the prac-
tice of lawyers, as part of a community participating in the 
social practice of adjudication, determines what constitutes le-
gitimate adjudication. 
The cost of mixing and matching is that adjudicators have 
significant discretion in their selection of appropriate deci-
sional norms, at least in hard cases.  This is frustrating to 
those who place a high value on predictability, stability, and 
equal treatment of litigants in adjudicated cases.166 
One possible way of constraining the discretion created by 
the practice of mixing and matching decisional norms is to 
determine if social practice includes an implicit hierarchy 
among different modalities of argument.  Fallon argues that 
there is a hierarchy.  He ranks the arguments in constitutional 
cases in the following order from most to least important: text, 
original intent, theory, precedent, and values.167  In a previous 
article, I also argued for a hierarchy, to wit, in the following 
order from most to least important: faithful agent arguments, 
arguments from precedent and settled practices, and moral 
and social welfare arguments.168  Balkin’s new originalism 
clearly gives precedence to original meaning over various forms 
of constitutional construction.169  In all these accounts, the 
proffered hierarchies rest on an intuition that faithful agent 
arguments carry the most weight in contemporary American 
practice, with arguments from precedent, if only because of 
163 BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 8. 
164 Fallon, Constructivist, supra note 153, at 1237–42. 
165 See, e.g., CAROLE C. BERRY & RAYMOND MICHAEL RIPPLE, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE 
ADVOCACY 69 (5th ed. 2016). 
166 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF  LAW 33–94 (1964) (summarizing the 
values promoted by the rule of law); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210 (2d ed. 2009). 
167 Fallon, Constructivist, supra note 153, at 1243–46. 
168 Merrill, Interpretation, supra note 85, at 1590–92. 
169 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 21–34; Balkin, New Originalism, 
supra note 158, at 645. 
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their extensive use, coming in ahead of arguments from settled 
practice, moral and social welfare arguments.  One can per-
ceive here a glimmer of consensus about an unstated hierar-
chy.  If the hierarchy were made more explicit, this might 
constrain the discretion of adjudicators, at least to a degree. 
Perhaps the most important form of ranking, already dis-
cussed, is that arguments from original meaning, precedent, 
and settled practice are robust in a way that arguments from 
morality and social welfare are not.  The reason is that argu-
ments from morality and social welfare are typically contested, 
and hence, in many cases, will not incur the assent of the loser. 
Consequently, arguments from morality and social welfare 
should provide the principal basis for decision only when those 
norms enjoy a very broad consensus.170 
III 
ARE APPEALS COURTS DIFFERENT? 
To this point I have assimilated all forms of adjudication 
together, treating adjudication as a unitary phenomenon in 
which the legitimacy of decisional norms is determined largely 
by the need to secure the assent of the loser.  A potential objec-
tion to this approach is that there are important differences 
among different types of adjudicators.  In particular, appeals 
courts are concerned primarily with resolving disputed ques-
tions of law.  Given that appeals courts specialize in norm clari-
fication and elaboration, it is possible that they proceed 
differently than trial courts, administrative agencies, or arbi-
trators in determining the proper content of decisional norms. 
This possibility would seem to be especially likely in consider-
ing high-level appeals courts, like the U.S. Supreme Court and 
state supreme courts, which have very broad discretion in de-
ciding what cases to hear, and hence have a significant degree 
of control over their decisional agenda. 
I agree that there are important differences between ap-
peals courts and other types of adjudicators.  And the contem-
porary U.S. Supreme Court represents the ultimate in 
discretionary control over its docket, with the Court insisting 
that it will agree to hear cases only when lower courts have 
disagreed about decisional norms or the case involves an im-
170 See Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on 
Supreme Court Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206, 213 (2012) (finding that support 
for the Supreme Court is highest when opinions use conventional legal arguments 
and declines when the Court’s reasoning becomes more controversial and 
“extraconstitutional”). 
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portant and unresolved question of law.171  Surely the Court 
functions like a “lawmaker” in a way that my hypothetical pro-
fessor tasked with representing a student in an honor code 
arbitration does not.  Perhaps this means that arguments from 
morality and social welfare play a larger role in Supreme Court 
cases than they do in primary level tribunals, and in this sense 
the Supreme Court is closer to a legislative body than to an 
adjudicator. 
There is clearly some merit to the objection.  Still, I think 
dispute resolution remains the ultimate basis for establishing 
legitimacy at all levels of adjudication.  Consider in this regard 
that the Supreme Court insists it will resolve cases only if they 
present a live controversy between adverse parties that will be 
resolved by adjudication.  It will not decide “undifferentiated, 
generalized grievance[s] about the conduct of the govern-
ment.”172  All Justices remain committed to characterizing its 
authority as based on dispute resolution, suggesting that this 
self-characterization is critical to its continued legitimacy.  Dis-
pute resolution remains a constant even if the Court primarily 
decides only important issues of law implicated by such 
disputes. 
Also, it is not true that appeals courts, including the Su-
preme Court, confine themselves strictly to questions of law 
and ignore the facts.173  As Shapiro points out, appeals courts, 
although nominally restricted to reviewing questions of law, 
will always review findings of fact under some standard of re-
view.  Shapiro explains that appellate courts keep “clawing 
their way back toward the facts” because they “continuously 
seek to reiterate their connection with the basis of all judicial 
legitimacy, conflict resolution.”174 
As an illustration, consider a recent abortion decision, 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.175  The majority opinion 
contains no discussion of the applicable decisional norms 
other than precedent.  The bulk of the opinion (and of the prin-
cipal dissent) consists of an elaborate evaluation of the facts 
about whether the Texas regulations being challenged would 
present an undue burden for women seeking abortions in the 
state—facts which the majority drew from an exhaustive review 
171 See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
172 Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007). 
173 See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2254–55 (2019) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s rewording of the question presented on 
certiorari so that it could reconsider the factual findings of the state courts). 
174 SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34, at 42–43. 
175 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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of the trial record, supplemented by the findings of other trial 
courts, representations in amicus briefs, newspaper articles, 
and even materials obtained through internet searches.176  An-
other recent example is provided by the conflict created when a 
same-sex couple requested a wedding cake from a local baker 
who refused on the ground that it would violate his religious 
convictions.177  The Court resolved the case by closely scruti-
nizing statements in the record generated by a local nondis-
crimination commission suggesting hostility toward the 
religious claims of the baker.178  The highest court in the land 
reverted to a type of review ordinarily performed by an interme-
diate appeals court under state administrative law.  These ex-
amples are admittedly exceptional, yet they show that fact-
finding is hardly irrelevant, even in the highest and most dis-
cretionary appellate tribunals. 
A more refined argument to the effect that high-level ap-
peals courts are different might be that the audience changes 
as litigation proceeds to higher levels of tribunals.  Focusing on 
changes in the audience is consistent with the social practices 
conception of legitimacy adopted in this Article.  If the audience 
for the adjudicator’s decisions changes, the recognitional com-
munity that determines whether the adjudication is legitimate 
may also change.  Thus, the decisions of arbitration panels, 
administrative law judges, and trial courts are almost invaria-
bly significant only to the immediate parties seeking resolution 
of their dispute.  As to these primary-level tribunals, it is plau-
sible to say that the only critical variable is whether the loser 
accepts the legitimacy of the ruling.  But as the dispute moves 
to higher level appeals courts, and especially as they move to a 
tribunal of national significance like the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the relevant audience whose views matter arguably becomes 
much wider.  As to such high-level tribunals, the objection 
might run, the critical factor may be whether the general public 
regards the decision as legitimate.  This may suggest, in turn, 
that for high level appeals courts the outcome reached by the 
court is what is important in determining the legitimacy of the 
process, as opposed to the decisional norms invoked by the 
court in reaching the decision.179 
176 Id. at 2311–18. 
177 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1723 (2018). 
178 Id. at 1729. 
179 Evidence as to whether judges are influenced by public opinion is mixed. 
See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 88 (2013) (review-
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There is again clearly some merit to the objection.  Cer-
tainly one can think of a number of U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions—such as Brown v. Board of Education,180 Roe v. 
181 182 183Wade, Bush v. Gore, Citizens United v. FEC,  and 
Obergefell v. Hodges184—which are headline news and which 
are presumably familiar (even if not by name) to a large portion 
of the general population.  As to these decisions, the outcome 
reached is clearly what matters to the general public, not the 
particular decisional norms or line of reasoning used in reach-
ing the decision.  And if the Court consistently reached out-
comes in these cases that resulted in strong rates of 
disapproval from the general public, its standing with the pub-
lic would presumably decline. 
Again, there is some merit to the objection.  High level ap-
peals courts are probably constrained in cases of great moment 
to reach outcomes that they perceive will be acceptable to a 
wider audience, at least if it is possible to do so in a legally 
credible fashion.  But it is a mistake to think that the general 
public pays much attention to the decisions of courts except in 
relatively unusual circumstances.  The vast majority of appeals 
court decisions are of interest only to the parties to the case 
and their lawyers.  And even decisions that have a political 
valence, in the sense that they divide judges along predictable 
liberal-conservative lines, are rarely of interest other than to 
lawyers who specialize in the area of law in question.  This is a 
wider audience than the parties to the case and their lawyers, 
but it is tiny relative to the size of the general public or even the 
legal community at large.  And the specialist-lawyers, like the 
lawyers who advise the parties to the controversy, will regard 
such decisions as legitimate insofar as they comport with deci-
sional norms that are regarded as legitimate, even if they disa-
gree with the decision on policy grounds. 
Another way of looking at appeals courts is that they are 
not an exception to the dispute resolution model of adjudica-
tion but serve as an integral part of the strategy for assuring 
ing studies).  A conceptual difficulty in measuring the effect of public opinion is 
that it is hard to know “whether judges are responding to public opinion or to the 
same things that shape public opinion . . . .” Id. 
180 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
181 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
182 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
183 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the First Amend-
ment protects the right of corporations to spend unlimited sums of money in 
support or opposition to candidates for election). 
184 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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the legitimacy of adjudication.  As Shapiro observes, the right 
to appeal helps take the sting out of losing an adjudication: 
“[A]ppeal allows the loser to continue to assert his rightness in 
the abstract without attacking the legitimacy of the legal sys-
tem or refusing to obey the trial court.”185  Indeed, the right to 
appeal reinforces legitimacy even if it is not exercised: “The 
loser can leave the courtroom with his head high talking of 
appeal and then accept his loss, slowly, privately, and passively 
by failing to make an appeal.”186  Everyone is familiar with the 
losing advocate who resolves to appeal the case “all the way to 
the Supreme Court” but never follows through.  In this sense, 
appeal functions as a safety value which helps assure that 
losers accept the legitimacy of the judgment—my test for legiti-
mate adjudication.  Whether appeals courts also serve to clarify 
and elaborate decisional norms is a byproduct of their basic 
function in helping to preserve the legitimacy of adjudication. 
IV 
SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
My primary objective in this Article has been to explicate 
and describe what I take to be the conditions that establish 
legitimate adjudication and in particular the decisional norms 
that reinforce the legitimacy of adjudication.  My central claim 
is that if we start by asking what legitimate adjudication is, we 
find that a number of decisional norms are regarded as legiti-
mate.  I will close, however, with some normative thoughts 
that, if they do not follow from this exercise, at least resonate 
with it.  Each normative concern focuses on a different aspect 
of current judicial practice.  What unites them is a trend away 
from dispute resolution in the direction of law declaration and 
with that trend, a rising danger of a more general challenge to 
the legitimacy of the courts.  This in turn imperils what is ar-
guably the United States’ greatest asset: its reputation as a 
country where both public and private actors are held to ac-
count by the rule of law. 
A. Faithful Agent Interpretation of Old Texts 
A primary normative implication concerns the problem of 
achieving legitimacy in cases that are governed by old legal 
texts.187  The principal example, of course, is the U.S. Consti-
185 SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34, at 49. 
186 Id. 
187 The argument in this subpart is treated at greater length in Merrill, 
Unamendable Text, supra note 157. 
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tution, the main body of which is some 230 years old and which 
has been amended only 27 times, with no amendment having 
been proposed and adopted in the last 40 years.  In our present 
state of political and geographic polarization, further amend-
ment seems unlikely in the foreseeable future given the diffi-
culty of securing the assent of two-thirds of both houses of the 
Congress and three-fourths of the states.  A number of founda-
tional statutes, including the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
Sherman Act, the Voting Rights Act, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, and the Clean Air Act have also defied attempts at 
amendment in recent decades.188 
As a general matter, as we have seen, the decisional norm 
that enjoys the highest degree of legitimacy is faithful agent 
interpretation.  All or nearly all commentators concede that an 
adjudicator is bound by the text of a relevant enactment that 
has the force of law.189  The adjudicator is not permitted to 
ignore the text or declare that it is outweighed by other consid-
erations such as morality or social utility.  It is also revealing 
that many of the most vocal critics of originalism concede that 
“courts should presumptively treat original meanings of rela-
tively newly adopted provisions as dispositive.”190  These critics 
thus concede that recently enacted and directly relevant texts 
must be interpreted in accordance with the faithful agent 
norm.  Their position, at least implicitly, is that faithful agent 
interpretation has an expiration date, such that it no longer 
applies to enacted laws after they reach a certain age. 
What might explain the falloff in the plausibility of faithful 
agent interpretation as constitutional and statutory provisions 
age?  There is a simple functional explanation and a more de-
batable jurisprudential one.  The functional explanation is that 
as enactments age, it becomes more difficult to comprehend 
what they were designed to accomplish and to translate this 
understanding to modern controversies.191  Meanwhile, prece-
dents pile up and tend to speak more directly to contested 
188 Id. at 549–50. 
189 See, e.g., FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 85 (“[W]hat ulti-
mately matters today . . . is that everyone continues to accept the Constitution . . . 
as valid, binding law.”); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question 
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”). 
190 Berman, supra note 1, at 68. 
191 See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
445, 463–64 (1984); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 218–22 (1980). 
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issues.192  So precedent becomes a more accessible tool for 
lawyers to draw upon in urging how decisional norms should 
be formulated and a more persuasive basis for use from the 
perspective of adjudicators.  Some confirmation of this is pro-
vided by certain controversies where precedent is thin or has 
depreciated in force due to nonuse.  In these circumstances, 
faithful agent arguments tend to return to the fore, even if the 
enactment is very old.  Recent controversies about the Second 
Amendment and the Alien Tort Statute illustrate this.193 
The jurisprudential explanation, advanced by Richard 
Primus, is that the consent of the sovereign people fades away 
as time passes and the enacting generation dies off.194  Thus, 
the original meaning gradually loses is power to command the 
assent of the governed.  There is probably something to this, 
although it remains true that even non-originalists generally 
concede that the text of old enactments remains binding, even 
if their original meaning is not.195  After all, non-originalists do 
not argue that there is no duty to comply with the First Amend-
ment or the Equal Protection Clause or other old provisions of 
which they approve.  The argument is over what these provi-
sions mean.  There is also the awkward fact that as the Consti-
tution ages, it increasingly takes on the role of something like a 
sacred symbol of the nation, which carries over into veneration 
of the Framers and (perhaps) what they sought to 
accomplish.196 
Whatever the explanation, the demise of faithful agent ar-
guments with respect to aged enactments is troubling, given 
the superior status of these arguments in terms of the implicit 
192 See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of 
Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 285 (2005). 
193 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117–24 (2013) (exten-
sively canvasing original materials in interpreting a statute passed in 1789 and 
rarely invoked thereafter); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,  621–24 
(2008) (engaging in extensive discussion of original meaning of the Second 
Amendment when the most recent precedent was over seventy years old); id. at 
652–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing similar material); see also Steven G. 
Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 635, 687 (2006) (noting that the Court often reverts to original mean-
ing when overruling constitutional precedents). 
194 Primus, supra note 162, at 186–201. 
195 See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4 (acknowledging that the 
text is binding but arguing that broadly worded clauses should be interpreted in 
an evolutionary manner). 
196 Michael Dorf has argued that originalist arguments often resonate as a 
kind of celebration of the framers as “ancestors” or “heroes.”  Dorf, supra note 84, 
at 1801–10.  To the extent there is something to this—and I think there is—then 
deviating from the understandings of the generation that adopted Constitution 
may be regarded as a kind of insult to the “founding fathers.” 
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hierarchy of decisional norms.  There are two standard re-
sponses to the problem.  One, which is epitomized by Justice 
Clarence Thomas’s innumerable dissenting and concurring 
opinions, is to insist on adhering to faithful agent interpreta-
tion, without regard to the consequences.197  On this approach, 
the many precedents and established practices that deviate 
from the correct discernment of the original understanding 
would be overruled.  The prospect of this position being 
adopted and carried out by the courts is highly remote given 
the massive disruption it would entail. 
The second standard response, which is much more popu-
lar in the legal academy, is to urge the substitution of dynamic 
decisional norms, like moral arguments and social welfare ar-
guments, for faithful agent interpretation of old and unamend-
able texts.  This would seem to be a point of agreement that 
unites otherwise quite diverse thinkers such as Ronald Dwor-
kin, Bill Eskridge, and Richard Posner.198  The problem with 
this response is that it is highly vulnerable to the charge that 
the adjudicator is simply imposing its own policy preferences in 
the form of a supposed interpretation of the text.  This is likely 
to lead (and has led) to the charge that the adjudicator is “legis-
lating from the bench.”199 
197 See generally, HENRY MARK HOLZER, THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS OF CLAR-
ENCE  THOMAS, 1991–2006: A CONSERVATIVE’S  PERSPECTIVE (2007) (collecting opin-
ions of Justice Thomas advocating originalism). 
198 See generally, DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 122; ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra 
note 9; POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 136. 
199 For evidence that opinion about the legitimacy of the Court declines as its 
decisions are perceived to align with the political preferences of the Justices, see, 
e.g., Vanessa A. Baird & Amy Gangl, Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of 
the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of Fairness, 27 
POL. PSYCHOL. 597, 607 (2006) (“[O]ur results suggest that perceptions of fairness 
are adversely affected when people receive information about a politically charged 
Court, indicating a likely decline in public support for the institution if citizens 
came to see judicial deliberations to be . . . politically driven . . . .”); Brandon L. 
Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, Political Justice? Perceptions of Politicization 
and Public Preferences Toward the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 76 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 105, 113 (2012) (noting that “[t]o the degree . . . the process . . . 
becomes more visibly politicized, we should expect citizens’ differentiation of the 
Court from the explicitly political branches to decrease, leading to even further 
politicization”); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public 
Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 659–60 (1992) (“To the 
extent that the Court becomes politicized or perceived as such, it risks cutting 
itself off from its natural reservoir of goodwill and may become reliant for basic 
institutional support on those who profit from its policies.  This is a risky position 
for any institution to adopt.”).  For recent evidence that the public increasingly 
perceives the judiciary as afflicted by political bias, see S.I. Strong, How Legal 
Academics Can Participate in Judicial Education: A How-to Guide by Richard Pos-
ner, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 421, 422 n.5 (2017) (book review). 
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In short, the difficulty of engaging in faithful agent inter-
pretation of old and unamendable texts such as the Constitu-
tion leads directly to the standoff described in the Introduction 
between “originalists” and “living constitutionalists.”  There is 
no sign, as things presently stand, that either side in the end-
less debate over legitimate interpretation is posed to vanquish 
the other. 
A better solution to the problem posed by very old texts is 
to shift the locus of decision toward enactments that are more 
recent or more susceptible to amendment.  In other words, ad-
judicators should try, if possible, to avoid resolving disputes 
based on the Constitution and certain foundational statutes 
and instead rely more on relatively recent statutes and admin-
istrative regulations.  This would allow robust faithful agent 
arguments—in the form of arguments from original meaning— 
to resume their rightful place in the menu of decisional norms 
used by adjudicators in resolving disputes between adverse 
parties. 
How might this be accomplished?  One way would be to 
revive and generalize the avoidance canons highlighted in Jus-
tice Brandeis’s famous Ashwander concurrence.200  Constitu-
tional decisions should be avoided, if possible, along with 
decisions grounded in other old and unamendable texts.  An-
other way would be to interpret the Constitution and other 
aged texts in a stand-pat or Burkean fashion in order to create 
incentives for parties to seek legal change by securing the 
adoption of relatively more amendable enactments (like stat-
utes and administrative regulations).201  Stand-patism could 
be advanced by leaning on nondynamic decisional norms, like 
settled practice and a strict approach to precedent,202 and 
downplaying relatively more dynamic norms, like creative uses 
of precedent, and moral and social welfare arguments.203 
Paradoxically, once enacted laws become very old, original 
meaning arguments are likely to function like sources of legal 
change, assuming (as is likely) that the law as defined by prece-
dent and settled practice has diverged from what a faithful 
reconstruction of original meaning would reveal.  So using orig-
inal meaning arguments when texts are old and unamendable 
becomes a tool for activists seeking social change through liti-
200 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring). 
201 Merrill, Unamendable Text, supra note 157, at 589–90. 
202 See id. at 591. 
203 See id. at 592. 
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gation.204  The basic point is that adjudicators should try to 
steer the law in the direction of relatively more current or 
amendable laws.205  This may be the only way to revive the use 
of faithful agent decisional norms—the decisional norms that 
appears to enjoy the highest level of legitimacy—in an era when 
the Constitution and many framework statutes are very old. 
B. Scrabble Board Precedentialism 
A second normative implication concerns the manner in 
which adjudicators deploy arguments based on precedent.  Ar-
guments from precedent are significantly constrained.  One 
constraint, which is familiar, is that precedent that cannot be 
distinguished must be followed, unless overruled.206  Another 
constraint, less familiar, is that precedent that has congealed 
into settled practice will always be followed (so-called super 
precedent).207  A third constraint, which follows from the pas-
sive nature of adjudicative bodies, is that precedent cannot be 
revisited unless raised in a case brought by a party or in the 
case of a high level appeals court with discretion over its 
docket, unless the tribunal agrees to hear a case that chal-
lenges a precedent.208 
Notwithstanding these constraints, there is still significant 
room for different approaches to precedent.  I will highlight one 
difference, which I believe is reflected in the current practice of 
the Supreme Court.  I will describe the difference in terms of 
two stylized models of precedent-following behavior set forth in 
extrajudicial writing.  In actual practice, arguments from pre-
cedent undoubtedly reflect a complex matrix of approaches to 
following, distinguishing, extending, and narrowing prece-
204 J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE 
LOSING  THEIR  INALIENABLE  RIGHT TO  SELF-GOVERNANCE 57 (2012) (arguing that 
originalism, given its multiple exceptions, is an “invitation to unbridled subjectiv-
ity” and often serves as a form of “activism cloaked as restraint.”). 
205 See Merrill, Unamendable Text, supra note 157, at 594–99 (“Burkean inter-
pretation of unamenable texts should promote governance by means of relatively 
more amenable texts . . . because status-quo reinforcing interpretation, by defini-
tion, is inhospitable to efforts to achieve deliberate legal change through 
interpretation.”). 
206 See Sinclair, supra note 118, at 370 (citing Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in 
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 647, 654 (1999)). 
207 See id., at 364 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Prece-
dent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976)). 
208 See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The 
Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2006) (noting the “small 
proportion of the nation’s agenda that comes directly before the Supreme Court in 
particular and the courts in general”). 
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dents.209  The dichotomy I describe represents one pole cutting 
across a variegated landscape of conventions, with most invo-
cations of precedent by adjudicators falling somewhere in be-
tween these extremes. 
The first conception of precedent following is the integrity 
model, based on Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.210 
Dworkin illustrated his theory with the metaphor of a chain 
novel, the idea being that each adjudicator must account for 
chapters previously written by earlier authors, while retaining 
the freedom to add new characters or plot elements consistent 
with what has been laid down before.211  At a more conceptual 
level, Dworkin argued that adjudicators must resolve disputes 
in a manner consistent with the constraints of fit and principle. 
The requirement of fit means that the adjudicator must rule in 
such a way as to take into account what all previous adjudica-
tors (at the same or higher level in the decisional hierarchy) 
have decided.  The decision need not replicate every detail of 
every precedent, but a decision will be “flawed if it leaves unex-
plained some major structural aspect” of prior decisions.212 
The requirement of principle means that the adjudicator must 
adopt a theory that explains prior decisions and generates a 
result in the present case that is the “best, all things consid-
ered.”213  For Dworkin, “the best”  meant a principle based on 
“political morality.”214  Dworkin was a bit unusual in that he 
believed that there is generally one right answer to legal ques-
tions, once one factors in political morality, rightly under-
stood.215  Most scholars today are less confident that questions 
of political morality have a single right answer; at least, they 
are likely to be somewhat skeptical that adjudicators have the 
right answer to such questions.216 
Still, one can interpret Dworkin’s theory in a way that im-
poses a significant degree of constraint on arguments from 
precedent.  The theory can be reformulated as stipulating that 
arguments from precedent must satisfy the requirement of fit, 
209 For an illuminating discussion, see generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing 
Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014) (noting the many 
ways the Court narrows precedent). 
210 See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 122. 
211 Id. at 228–38. 
212 Id. at 230. 
213 Id. at 231. 
214 Id. at 216. 
215 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 41–43 (2006). 
216 See id. at 42 (“Legal theorists have an apparently irresistible impulse . . . to 
insist that the one-right-answer thesis must mean something more than is cap-
tured in the ordinary opinion that one side had the better argument . . . .”). 
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that is, they must explain all “major aspects” of past decisions, 
and they must be principled, in the sense that they articulate 
some decisional rule that both accounts for the prior decisions 
and provides a foundation for ruling in the present and foresee-
able future cases.  This might be a principle of political moral-
ity, but it could also be a principle grounded in a generalization 
from original meaning, or from settled practice, or from consid-
erations of social welfare. 
A very different model of precedent following is one offered 
in passing by Justice Scalia in his Tanner Lectures at 
Princeton.217  He suggested there that the common law, which 
he regarded as a pure form of decision by precedent, is like a 
game of Scrabble.218  As he put it, “[n]o rule of decision previ-
ously announced [can] be erased, but qualifications [can] be 
added to it.”219  The Scrabble Board model shares with the 
integrity model the understanding that the adjudicator cannot 
ordinarily erase the blocks of letters that have been previously 
laid on the board.  And it shares with Dworkin’s model the 
understanding that the adjudicator, once the constraint of fi-
delity to past decisions is satisfied, exercises a significant de-
gree of discretion.  Where the Scrabble Board model differs is in 
its understanding of how the judge exercises the discretion that 
remains after the various constraints of the precedent system 
are satisfied.  The objective of the players in a Scrabble game, 
to put it bluntly, is to score the most points.  This is clearly 
what Justice Scalia sought to convey by his metaphor.  Subject 
to the constraint against disregarding indistinguishable prece-
dent, he regarded the precedent-following judge as one who 
seeks to resolve cases so as to maximize his or her personal 
legal and policy preferences.220  Moreover, the judge’s personal 
preferences need not conform to any overarching principle that 
brings coherence to the full range of decisions over time.  The 
preferences may simply reflect the judge’s desire to mold the 
law in a way that the judge finds more congenial.221 
217 See generally, ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
218 Id. at 8. 
219 Id. at 8.  Switching metaphors, Justice Scalia also compared the prece-
dent-oriented judge to a broken field runner: “distinguishing one prior case on the 
left, straight-arming another one on the right, high-stepping away from another 
precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal— 
good law.” Id. at 9. 
220 See id. 
221 This cynical view of precedent following is not new. See JEROME FRANK, LAW 
AND THE  MODERN  MIND 163 (2009) [originally published 1936] (commenting 
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Scalia’s image of precedent following as a game of Scrabble 
thus presents a picture of the precedent-following adjudicator 
as an aggressive manipulator seeking to advance his or her 
legal and policy preferences.  The adjudicator may not disturb 
previous moves by others already on the board.222  But other-
wise the adjudicator, if he or she can garner the requisite sup-
port from other like-minded members of the tribunal, is 
expected to adopt distinctions, extensions, and qualifications 
of what has been decided in the past in an effort to advance his 
or her legal or policy preferences.223 
A good example of the Scrabble Board model in action is 
last Term’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie.224  The Court took the 
case to decide whether to overrule a longstanding administra-
tive law doctrine, called “Auer deference,” which says that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling un-
less ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”225 
The Court declined to overrule Auer, but proceeded to set forth 
five major qualifications on the doctrine, some based on analo-
gies to other administrative law doctrines, others on generaliza-
tions from previous decisions applying Auer, and still others 
supported by statements in dissenting opinions.226  The up-
shot was that the Court could claim that it was following prece-
dent (Auer) while at the same time significantly modifying the 
law.227 
“[s]omehow or other, there are plenty of precedents to go around”—enough, he 
suggested, to support any outcome in any given case). 
222 Scalia, supra note 217, at 8. 
223 Id. at 8–9 (“The first case lays on the board: ‘No liability for breach of 
contractual duty without privity’; the next player adds ‘unless injured party is 
member of household.’  And the game continues.”). 
224 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2019). 
225 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
226 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–18.  The qualifications were borrowed from 
the jurisprudence elaborating on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415; taken from a dissent-
ing opinion in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257–59 & n.6 (2001), 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416; supported by language contained in a decision deter-
mining which of two agencies given divided authority is entitled to deference, 
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144, 153 
(1991), Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417; and derived from the generalization of an 
exception recognized in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 
(2012), Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417. 
227 The outcome in Kisor was not particularly controversial among the Jus-
tices, other than that it was seen as a kind of precursor of some future showdown 
over the fate of the Chevron doctrine.  The division centered on whether to overrule 
Auer and replace it with the standard of review associated with Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), as urged in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion, see 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2442–43 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), or to preserve Auer but 
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The normative concern here is that the Supreme Court, at 
least in cases where law is highly unamendable and arguments 
from precedent dominate, is increasingly gravitating toward the 
Scrabble Board model of precedent.  This is particularly true in 
areas of constitutional law that have a significant political va-
lence, but fly below the radar of general public awareness. 
Examples might include questions about state sovereign im-
munity,228 qualified immunity for officials charged with civil 
rights violations,229 preemption of tort law,230  commercial 
speech cases,231  the availability of class actions,232  and regu-
latory takings cases.233  What we increasingly see in these ar-
eas are decisions by the Court that leave all relevant 
precedents undisturbed, but add qualifications or exceptions 
that move the law in a direction favored by the legal or policy 
preferences of the Justices in the majority.234  These moves 
tend not to be supported by the articulation of some overarch-
ing principle, in the manner of the integrity model.235  Rather, 
the decisions are justified by reading favored precedents 
broadly, disfavored precedents narrowly, and by compiling 
masses of quotations culled from a variety of authorities.236 
The dissenting opinions tend to produce mirror image exer-
cises, emphasizing broad readings of different precedents and 
offering competing quotations.237  With the policy preferences 
extensively reconstruct it, as pursued by the majority, see Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 
2415–18 (majority opinion).  Quite arguably the majority’s approach, grounded in 
Scrabble Board precedentialism, resulted in the greater change in existing law. 
228 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
229 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
230 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
231 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). 
232 See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
233 See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
234 For discussion of the path of regulatory takings decisions in terms of differ-
ent models of precedent, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Supreme Court’s Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine and the Perils of Common Law Constitutionalism, 34 J. OF LAND 
USE 1, 8–26 (2018). 
235 Id. at 4. 
236 See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s 
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156, 
1195–96 (2005). 
237 For some qualitative evidence of this at the Supreme Court level, see gener-
ally Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 
(2016).  Several studies of precedent-following behavior at the court of appeals 
level reveal similar patterns. See e.g., Lindquist & Cross, supra note 236, at 
1200–06 (finding that “[p]recedent appears to have a moderately constraining 
effect on judicial freedom” and that “while our system of precedent creates some 
path dependence in law, it is relatively weak, leaving judges ample opportunity to 
abandon a given path should it appear, in the clearer light of hindsight, unwise”); 
Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
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of the Justices now perfectly aligned with those of the party 
that appointed them, the result has been aptly described as a 
“political Court,” with the qualification that the Court operates 
only in narrow areas of controversy and is constrained in other 
ways, as I have described.238 
The larger normative concern, in keeping with the themes 
of this Article, is that the Court has been able to move toward 
the Scrabble Board model only because it has amassed, over 
many years, a large reservoir of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
lawyers who appear before it and the larger public more gener-
ally.239  As things stand, although the Court increasingly re-
solves cases politically salient cases in ways that conform to 
the majority’s legal and policy preferences, the losers continue 
to acquiesce in its judgments.  But with each decision, a small 
portion of its reservoir of legitimacy is consumed.  Eventually, 
the reservoir may be depleted, and the losers may regard the 
Court’s decisions as simply a matter of the “brute force” of two 
against one.240  When this happens, the Court may face a gen-
eral crisis of legitimacy.241 
To head this off, the Court should strive to resolve cases, as 
best it can, in accordance with objective decisional norms, 
meaning settled forms of argument.  It is difficult to do this 
when faithful agent arguments fade away, as has happened in 
constitutional law and increasingly in statutory and adminis-
trative law where political polarization and associated legisla-
tive gridlock have made large chunks of statutory law 
unamendable.  As this happens, precedent comes to the fore as 
the dominant mode of legitimate argument.  But argument 
1789, 1819 (2016) (finding that “the ideological composition of federal appellate 
panels—whether a Democratic or Republican President appointed members of the 
panel—powerfully predicts the type of precedent they include in their opinions”); 
Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Disharmony: A Study of Dissent, 42 
INT’L  REV. OF L. & ECON. 60, 61 (2015) (finding that on divided appeals panels, 
“[p]recedents that are cited only by the majority are strongly correlated with the 
ideology of the majority judge; precedents that are cited only by the dissent are 
strongly correlated with the ideology of the dissenting judge.”). 
238 Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization 
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301–03; 
see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39 (2005). See supra Part I. 
239 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
241 Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 138–39 (2008) 
(“[W]ithin a particular jurisdiction, courts may accrue something akin to credit for 
their longstanding conformity with standards of correct judicial decision, so that 
the occasional act of extreme boldness . . . acquires authority not simply because 
it is successful but also because the track record of a particular court suggests 
that such action would never be undertaken lightly.”). 
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from precedent, however constrained, is vulnerable to corrup-
tion in the form of Scrabble Board precedentialism.242  The 
Court needs, at a minimum, to move closer to the integrity 
model of precedent, supplemented by a more explicit use of 
arguments from settled practice and by moral arguments and 
social welfare arguments that enjoy a high degree of social 
consensus. 
The normative argument for resisting Scrabble Board 
precedentialism is grounded, once again, in the belief that pre-
serving the rule of law is vital to the future of liberal democracy 
and that preserving the rule of law requires maintaining the 
legitimacy of the dominant forms of adjudication in society.243 
Conceivably, the courts will come to be perceived as hopelessly 
politicized, and society will turn to arbitration as the primary 
form of dispute resolution.  But much will surely be lost if this 
happens.  Far better for the courts, and other adjudicators, to 
remember always that the ultimate source of their legitimacy is 
the belief of losers that their case has been resolved in accor-
dance with objective legal norms, not because the adjudicator 
harbors a personal preference for the winner. 
C. Universal Injunctions 
A third normative concern involves the recent wave of “na-
tionwide” injunctions (perhaps more precisely, “universal” in-
junctions) against particular policies adopted by the executive 
branch.244  This development reveals that the law declaration 
perspective is not the monopoly of the Supreme Court.  It has 
the potential to move rapidly down the judicial hierarchy to 
include federal district courts and perhaps other tribunals as 
well. 
Both the Obama Administration and the Trump Adminis-
tration have been stymied by universal injunctions barring the 
implementation of their respective immigration policies.245 
Both have complained that the scope of these injunctions is 
242 See supra notes 217–220 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
244 See generally Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really 
“Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
335, 336 (2018) (“Recent constitutional litigation has challenged the validity of 
laws, regulations, and policies from the Obama and Trump Administrations regu-
lating immigration and immigration-adjacent matters.  Plaintiffs have brought 
pre-enforcement lawsuits seeking to enjoin responsible federal officials from en-
forcing challenged laws, regulations, and policies.”). 
245 For an overview of the cases, see id. at 340–48. 
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improper.246  The universal injunction seeks to handcuff the 
executive by exploiting an aspect of the law of equity—that it 
acts in personam on the defendant.247  When a court of equity 
obtains jurisdiction over a defendant, it can enter an order 
directing the defendant to desist from certain actions or to take 
certain affirmative actions in order to provide complete relief to 
the plaintiff.  Given this understanding, it is easy to see how a 
federal district court that obtains jurisdiction over a federal 
agency or department can assert the power to enjoin the defen-
dant agency or department from taking action that the district 
court regards as unlawful—anywhere. 
The universal injunction could be called the nuclear option 
in the assertion of judicial supremacy over the political 
branches.  In effect, it converts what would ordinarily be gov-
erned by the norms of stare decisis—the question whether one 
legal actor regards itself as obliged to follow the legal under-
standing reflected in a judgment rendered by another legal ac-
tor—into a judgment that is binding on the executive with the 
force of law.  As most commentators have perceived, this is 
deeply problematic.248  Two sitting Justices have called for the 
Court, “at an appropriate juncture,” to reign in the practice.249 
What is wrong with universal injunctions?  To begin, the 
universal injunction encourages an extreme form of forum 
shopping.250  Opponents of the Obama Administration—most 
prominently red state attorneys general—liked the Southern 
District of Texas as their source for universal injunctions.251 
246 Id. at 364; President Barack Obama, The White House, Remarks by the 




247 See Wasserman, supra note 244, at 354–65. 
248 In addition to Wasserman, supra note 244, at 338–39, see DOUGLAS LAY-
COCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 436–37 (4th ed. 2010); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple 
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (2017); 
cf. Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 
1069 (2018) (acknowledging that limiting injunctions to injured plaintiffs should 
be the default rule but that exceptions are appropriate). 
249 DHS v. New York, No. 19A785, slip op. at 5 (Jan. 27, 2020) (Gorsuch, J., 
joined by Thomas J., concurring) at 5; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 
(2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
250 As Bray observes, if plaintiffs do not succeed in getting the requested 
injunction on the first attempt, they can “[s]hop ‘til the statute drops.”  Bray, 
supra note 248, at 460. 
251 Dan Frosch & Jacob Gershman, Abbott’s Strategy in Texas: 44 Lawsuits, 
One Opponent: Obama Administration, WALL ST. J., (June 24, 2016, 10:36 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/abbotts-strategy-in-texas-44-lawsuits-one-oppo-
nent-obama-administration-1466778976 [https://perma.cc/E5Q4-HXKN]. 





1458 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1395 
Opponents of the Trump Administration prefer the Northern 
District of California, Maryland, and Hawaii.252  The success of 
these ideologically-motivated plaintiffs in obtaining universal 
injunctions in these forums has generated extensive news cov-
erage and is likely to encourage the public perception that the 
federal judiciary is hopelessly politicized.253 
The injunctions in question also undermine deliberation 
about the appropriate decisional norms that should govern ju-
dicial action.  They are typically temporary restraining orders 
or preliminary injunctions, and as such are subject to revision 
and even outright rejection after full consideration on the mer-
its.  They are also vulnerable to being stayed by higher level 
tribunals.254  And as illustrated by the litigation over the 
Trump Administration’s so-called travel ban, the initial prelim-
inary injunction can be mooted by successive revisions by the 
executive branch in the matter under review.255  Reflecting the 
views of a single federal judge, a universal injunction lacks the 
authority of a Supreme Court decision or even a decision by a 
panel of a court of appeals.256  Such an injunction, especially 
on an issue of great political controversy like immigration pol-
icy, is unlikely to achieve general assent about the require-
ments of the law.  It is more likely to embroil the federal 
judiciary in ongoing controversy and accentuate the charge 
that judges are just another type of partisan actor.257 
The universal injunction also frustrates the intercircuit 
percolation that helps the Supreme Court decide when to inter-
vene and illuminates the arguments in favor of different legal 
understandings.258  When a federal district court issues a uni-
252 See Rebecca Davis O’Brien & Sadie Gurman, States File Suit Against Trump 
Administration over Wall Emergency, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2019, 9:27 PM), https:/ 
/www.wsj.com/articles/california-lawsuit-is-expected-on-wall-emergency-
11550535544 [https://perma.cc/VH2A-V4RX]. 
253 The Editorial Board, The Judicial Injunction Dysfunction, WALL ST. J., (July 
28, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-national-injunction-dys-
function-11564348739 [https://perma.cc/K4HQ-ZC3K]; Robert Knight, Dems 
Respect the Constitution Only When it Suits Them, WASH. TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/18/democrats-respect-the-
us-constitution-only-when-it/ [https://perma.cc/JZ29-KLQ6]. 
254 See Wasserman, supra note 244, at 379. 
255 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403–06 (2018) (recounting the 
procedural history of the “travel ban”). 
256 See Bray, supra note 248, at 461–62. 
257 President Trump has disparaged the district judges who have entered uni-
versal injunctions as “so-called judges,” and Attorney General Jeff Sessions con-
demned the injunction entered against the travel ban as lawless action by “a 
single judge sitting on an island in the Pacific.”  Wasserman, supra note 244, at 
364 (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions). 
258 See Wasserman, supra note 244, at 378–79. 
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versal injunction the matter zips straight up the judicial hierar-
chy on a very fast track.  The administration will seek a stay 
from the court of appeals, which must resolve the matter on 
hastily prepared papers and an incomplete record under a 
standard of review that gives deference to the district court.  If 
the court of appeals denies a stay, the administration must go 
to the Supreme Court for a stay, which again must rule on 
hastily prepared papers and an incomplete record and without 
the benefit of full opinions by any court of appeals, including 
the court below.259  This short-circuits the process that ordina-
rily leads to the resolution of controversial legal questions.260 
The last concern, and to my mind the most serious, is that 
the practice of issuing nationwide injunctions of executive pol-
icy could jeopardize the received understanding that the execu-
tive has a legal duty to enforce all federal judicial orders.  As 
previously noted, this duty rests on statutory and conventional 
grounds.261  It is not compelled by the Constitution.  Which 
does not mean it is unimportant.  One can argue it is the 
lynchpin that makes ours a country governed by the rule of 
law.  One danger here is a funding cutoff or amendment of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 to deny enforcement of certain categories 
of universal injunctions or perhaps all injunctions against the 
government.  The greater danger is outright defiance of such 
orders.  The Parrillo study, previously mentioned, indicates 
that defiance of judicial injunctions is not a hypothetical possi-
bility.262  In recent history, it has occurred in low visibility con-
texts, involving structural injunctions affecting prisons, 
entitlement programs, and the like.263  In the current climate, 
one can readily imagine defiance coming from the top, justified 
perhaps by claims of national security and the status of the 
President as Commander in Chief.  The slope from constitu-
259 See DHS v. New York, No. 19A785, slip op. at 3–4 (Jan. 27, 2020) (Gor-
such, J., and Thomas, J., concurring) (“Rather than spending their time methodi-
cally developing arguments and evidence in cases limited to the parties at hand, 
both sides have been forced to rush from one preliminary injunction hearing to 
another, leaping from one emergency stay application to the next, each with 
potentially nationwide stakes, and all based on expedited briefing and little oppor-
tunity for the adversarial testing of evidence.”). 
260 In this respect, the universal injunction suffers from infirmities closely 
analogous to those that would arise if the executive branch were required immedi-
ately to acquiesce in any decision invalidating a regulation or administrative 
interpretation. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by 
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 757 (1989). 
261 See supra at notes 54–78 (discussing enforcement constraint). 
262 See supra at notes 66–68. 
263 Cf. Robert A. Schapiro, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231, 238 (1989). 
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tional republic to authoritarianism may be slipperier than we 
like to think. 
Unfortunately, we cannot rely on the good sense of every 
federal district judge to forbear from entering universal injunc-
tions.  In search of a solution, I suggest we turn to the distinc-
tion between the judgment power and the conventions of stare 
decisis.  With respect to judgments, I think Samuel Bray has 
the right idea: the traditions of equity and the understanding 
that injunctions operate in personam should be clarified to 
specify that injunctions are binding not only on the named 
defendant but also that they run only in favor of the named 
plaintiff.264  In effect, the law of standing, which limits relief to 
those who can show actual injury that will be redressed by 
eliminating allegedly unlawful action, should be extended to 
requests for injunctive relief.265  Enjoining a federal agency or 
department to act or desist from acting in certain ways with 
respect to “all the world” should be disclaimed.  Class actions 
seeking to enjoin the government should be possible, but only if 
they satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Suits by state attorneys general should be 
possible, but only on behalf of specific state institutions shown 
to have Article III standing, and then any equitable relief should 
be limited to those institutions.  An analogy would be to the 
understanding that principles of offensive collateral estoppel 
do not apply to the federal government, precisely for the reason 
that this would eliminate the needed percolation of issues 
before they must be resolved by the Supreme Court.266 
The Bray solution, standing alone, is subject to the familiar 
objection based on vertical equity.  If one plaintiff, represented 
perhaps by a state attorney general or pro bono, secures an 
injunction against the executive branch, why should other sim-
ilarly-situated persons, perhaps not so lucky in their represen-
tation, be forced to sue to secure the same relief?  The answer is 
that this ignores the operation of the conventions of stare deci-
sis.  To be sure, the reasoning of the district court that enters 
the injunction is not binding on other courts, not even within 
the same district.  But if the decision of the district court is 
affirmed on appeal, this decision will be binding on all district 
courts in the circuit.  And district judges will make short shrift 
of the government if it persists in litigating the issue in the 
circuit.  The courts may award attorneys fees to prevailing par-
264 Bray, supra note 248, at 469–80. 
265 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2428 (2018) (Thomas, J. concurring). 
266 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158–59 (1984). 
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ties under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), on the 
ground that the government’s position is not substantially jus-
tified.267  The prospect of fee-shifting will attract more repre-
sentation.  If the matter plays out the same in other circuits, 
the government will likely acquiesce and drop or modify the 
contested policy.  If the circuits disagree, the Supreme Court 
will likely intervene.  And the executive will almost surely com-
ply with the Supreme Court judgment—at least one that is the 
product of the ordinary process of careful deliberation reflect-
ing multiple points of view. 
The process is unlikely to appeal to the impatient.  But it 
has worked, over a significant span of time, in achieving a 
significant degree of coordination about the requirements of 
the law, even in the face of significant disagreement about the 
correct interpretation of the law.  A renewed emphasis on legiti-
mate adjudication—and with it, the dispute resolution function 
of adjudicators—would go far to restore a norm of self-restraint 
with respect to the proper scope of judicial injunctions. 
CONCLUSION 
Questions about what constitutes legitimate interpretation 
of enacted law, most prominently the Constitution, have been 
with us since the founding.  They have become more urgent in 
recent times, as arguments between originalists and living con-
stitutionalists grow heated and remain unresolved.  Original-
ists seem to have the better case as a matter of theory; living 
constitutionalists can claim greater congruence with judicial 
practice.  A similar unhappy choice dominates debates about 
statutory interpretation.  Textualists and purposivists battle 
for supremacy as a matter of theory; dynamic interpretation 
seems to offer a better account of actual practice.  The key 
point I advance in this Article is that the severe tradeoff be-
tween legitimacy and descriptive accuracy can be eliminated by 
adopting a different theory of legitimacy.  If we shift the focus 
from legitimate interpretation to legitimate adjudication, em-
brace a conception of adjudication as dispute resolution, and 
borrow the familiar conception of legitimacy advanced by 
H.L.A. Hart and the positivists based on social practice, the gulf 
between legitimacy and actual practice largely disappears.268 
The payoff from changing the focus from legitimate inter-
pretation to legitimate adjudication is potentially large.  The 
267 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2018). See generally Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552 (1988) (interpreting various aspects of the Act). 
268 See HART, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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literature on legitimate interpretation, in both constitutional 
and statutory interpretation contexts, suggests we must make 
a painful choice: either adjudicators must change their prac-
tices in order to achieve legitimacy, or we can endorse existing 
practice at the expense of nagging doubt about whether that 
practice is legitimate.  When we refocus the inquiry by asking 
what decisional norms are regarded as legitimate in adjudicat-
ing a dispute between adverse parties, we discover much 
greater congruence between what is regarded as legitimate and 
existing practice.  In particular, we find that not just argu-
ments about original meaning but also arguments from prece-
dent and settled practice are regarded as legitimate.  And we 
learn that there is even an accepted supporting role for argu-
ments from morality and social welfare.  The topography of 
legitimate decisional norms may fall short of the exuberant 
exhortations to promote social justice, associated with living 
constitutionalism and dynamic statutory interpretation.269 
But it offers a much better match with actual practice than the 
stern injunctions of originalists and textualists. 
I have argued that in determining when adjudication is 
legitimate, the social practice that matters is that of the parties 
to the adjudication, as advised by their lawyers.  It is critical 
that the loser in the adjudication not regard the outcome as 
simply a matter of the adjudicator harboring a personal prefer-
ence for the winner.  Viewed this way, the decisional norms 
that are regarded as legitimate in an adjudication are those 
that correspond to the expectations of the parties.  I have ar-
gued that three types of decisional norms are robustly legiti-
mate: faithful agent arguments, arguments from precedent, 
and arguments from settled practice.  Other more qualified de-
cisional norms are moral arguments and social welfare argu-
ments.  Adjudicators mix and match these decisional norms in 
various ways, depending on the relative strength of the argu-
ments in any given case.  This does not appear to undermine 
the legitimacy of the adjudication, perhaps because adjudica-
tors apply an unstated hierarchy among norms, including the 
understanding that moral and social welfare arguments play 
only a supplemental role unless the particular norm enjoys a 
very high degree of consensus. 
269 See WILKINSON, supra note 204, at 20 (characterizing living constitutional-
ism as “replete with vague exhortations about ‘human dignity,’ ‘evolving stan-
dards of decency,’ and the perceived demands of justice and needs of society”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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Social practice evolves over time, and I worry that the so-
cial practice of adjudication may be evolving in troublesome 
ways.  One concern is the age and extreme unamendability of 
the Constitution and many framework statutes, which tend to 
make faithful agent arguments problematic.  Another is that 
arguments from precedent have increasingly come to resemble 
Scrabble Board precedentalism, which is essentially a con-
strained but weakly disguised form of political judging.  A third 
is the recent emergence of the universal injunction as a weapon 
in the struggle over national immigration policy.  Unless re-
sisted, these developments could jeopardize the high level of 
legitimacy that adjudication has long enjoyed in our society. 
Because legitimate adjudication is a vital ingredient of preserv-
ing the rule of law, this is troublesome indeed. 
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